Spirit does smaller assemblies for Airbus, whose production is mostly in Europe. They don't do whole airframes for them afaik.
The client still has the responsibility of doing quality controls at reception, or have good reasons to lighten them. Boeing has a lot to answer, especially since FAA gave them (after a ton of lobbying) the right to self-control themselves.
To clarify, as it's slightly ambiguous, Spirit has two factories in the UK that do most of their work for Airbus. They were originally British businesses. It's easily possible for there to be a very different culture there.
FAA's delegatory structure used to involve Boeing-paid employees that reported to the FAA but that changed in 2004 (ODA instead of DER) such that the FAA put itself out of the loop. Here's the pre-2004 situation:
"Since at least 1927, the FAA has delegated certain safety certification responsibilities to qualified individuals within the aviation industry. Until 2004, the FAA regulated the production of new Boeing aircraft through a web of Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs), employees of Boeing charged with ensuring that new aircraft met regulatory standards. These DERs, though paid by Boeing, were selected by and reported to the FAA, which signed off on all certification decisions. “We knew we’d lose our livelihood if we didn’t maintain the integrity of making decisions the way the FAA would do it,” said a former DER. The FAA retained final authority and possessed a clear view of new aircraft’s certification process."
Regulatory Capture at the FAA By Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy, Leo Kalb Bourke, November 12, 2021
> Rolling back that 2004 ODA program to the DER structure would be the rational response at this point.
What's the rationale, again?
I'm not seeing any root cause analysis or justification in your text that reverting to a (still conflicted) secondee concept would prevent similar outcomes.
Comments
Spirit does smaller assemblies for Airbus, whose production is mostly in Europe. They don't do whole airframes for them afaik.
The client still has the responsibility of doing quality controls at reception, or have good reasons to lighten them. Boeing has a lot to answer, especially since FAA gave them (after a ton of lobbying) the right to self-control themselves.
To clarify, as it's slightly ambiguous, Spirit has two factories in the UK that do most of their work for Airbus. They were originally British businesses. It's easily possible for there to be a very different culture there.
https://www.spiritaero.com/company/programs/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spirit_AeroSystems
Then the FAA has a lot to answer for as well.
Assuming FAA's final safety check would've caught the issue at the time of inspection and not during the operating period when it malfunctioned.
FAA's delegation is common. For this instance, FAA has already launched a probe and revoked Boeing's DOA for final safety checks.[0]
[0] https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/boeing-manufacturing-7...
FAA's delegatory structure used to involve Boeing-paid employees that reported to the FAA but that changed in 2004 (ODA instead of DER) such that the FAA put itself out of the loop. Here's the pre-2004 situation:
Regulatory Capture at the FAA By Claremont Journal of Law and Public Policy, Leo Kalb Bourke, November 12, 2021
https://www.5clpp.com/?p=4026
Rolling back that 2004 ODA program to the DER structure would be the rational response at this point.
> Rolling back that 2004 ODA program to the DER structure would be the rational response at this point.
What's the rationale, again?
I'm not seeing any root cause analysis or justification in your text that reverting to a (still conflicted) secondee concept would prevent similar outcomes.
The rationale is that Boeing got an exception from best practices, so they should revert to best practices.
Respectfully, you're repeating the parent and not addressing my question.
What "best practice" from before, albeit which had a secondee structure, would've caught this malfunction?