The scenario where MCAS cuts out, and it's in the envelope of conditions where it actually functions, and the pilots fail to notice this, and the MCAS inputs were needed to avoid approaching a stall, and the pilots fail to correct and avoid the stall .. it's a contrived hypothetical.
On a 737 they are retracted early in the climb, typically between 1000 and 1250 feet. If the slight stick movement the pilot is accustomed to to bring the elevation down 2-3* fails to do so cause MCAS does not engage, there's not a whole lot of distance to recover from a stall then.
If the slight stick movement the pilot is accustomed to to bring the elevation down 2-3* fails to do so
This is completely unrelated to MCAS, though? Since the goal of MCAS wasn't "bring the nose down" but instead "increase the pressure on the stick required to maintain a certain nose-up attitude", I'd be really flabbergasted if it was supposed to operate in a normal takeoff environment.
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Literally a take-off where one AOA sensor fails.
But MCAS is disabled when flaps are extended, such as on takeoff?
On a 737 they are retracted early in the climb, typically between 1000 and 1250 feet. If the slight stick movement the pilot is accustomed to to bring the elevation down 2-3* fails to do so cause MCAS does not engage, there's not a whole lot of distance to recover from a stall then.
This is completely unrelated to MCAS, though? Since the goal of MCAS wasn't "bring the nose down" but instead "increase the pressure on the stick required to maintain a certain nose-up attitude", I'd be really flabbergasted if it was supposed to operate in a normal takeoff environment.
The goal was always bring the nose down, stick input not required.