According to Western intelligence reports, Russian scientists warned the Kremlin that they could be facing "another Chernobyl" if they were forced to comply with Iran's tight deadline to activate the complex this summer.
I am really confused. I thought the goal of Stuxnet was to delay the production of Iranian enrichment efforts at Natanz. Not to delay a civilian reactor at Bushehr, which is hundreds of miles away.
Assuming the Telegraph report is correct, I don't see how this tells us anything about how effective Stuxnet was at delaying enrichment efforts.
I'll accept anything, but I'll give more credence to some sources than others.
But this seems backward. If there is no evidence that Stuxnet was effective at significantly delaying Iranian production, then people should stop saying that there is. My willingness to accept evidence really shouldn't have anything to do with it.
I'm asking because it's unlikely http://presstv.ir is going host an article saying that Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear bomb has been delayed.
Mossad is saying that Iran doesn't possess the capability to build a nuclear bomb before 2015 and it says attacking Iran would be unwise [1]. Can you think of any reason why they would be saying this unless they believed it to be true?
I'm asking because it's unlikely http://presstv.ir is going host an article saying that Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear bomb has been delayed.
True, but that doesn't mean we should accept every claim as true.
Can you think of any reason why they would be saying this unless they believed it to be true?
What? This doesn't tell us anything about the effectiveness of Stuxnet. Even if they did, intelligence services have a nasty habit of exaggerating their own effectiveness, so I'd find it more credible if that assessment came from another Israeli government organization or another nation's intelligence service altogether.
Even if they did, intelligence services have a nasty habit of exaggerating their own effectiveness
This is where we disagree (I also don't know where this perception comes from). In no way is it in Israel's best interest to do an about-face on their assessment of the time frame for a nuclear Iran unless they had good evidence that indeed Iran's capability to obtain nuclear weapons was severely diminished. Israel has been trying to convince the international community that Iran has been on the cusp of nuclear weapons for the past two years.
You're arguing that the organization Mossad is acting irrationally. What benefit does Mossad exaggerating their effectiveness bring Israel?
Beyond that, this is really basic systems theory. Intelligence service oversight, at least in the US, is very lax. The people doing oversight know a lot less about operations than the people being overseen. So when they screw up, they can spin their nominal bosses so that no one gets fired or goes to jail. It is really hard to keep secret and highly compartmentalized organizations honest. The principal agent problem is a big deal.
Which brings me to my question above: what evidence would you accept? I agree there is no concrete link (just as there is no concrete link between Israel and Stuxnet), but Iran is not going to a) announce their nuclear weapons program and b) detail how far Stuxnet has set them back.
> So when they screw up, they can spin their nominal bosses so that no one gets fired or goes to jail. It is really hard to keep secret and highly compartmentalized organizations honest.
I guess we just disagree on the reasons Mossad is making these statements. It makes no sense to me why Mossad would subject Israel to threat of annihilation in order to make Mossad leaders look good.
Let's assume Mossad isn't behaving pettily. Why would they make these statements unless they believed them to be true?
At the very least, to make a Mossad claim plausible, you'd need to have:
(1) a statement by Mossad issued before Stuxnet was released forecasting that Iran would have a weapon by time T_0
(2) a statement by Mossad issued after Stuxnet was released forecasting that Iran would have a weapon by time T_1
(3) T_1 larger than T_0 by at least a year
(4) a statement by Mossad claiming that there were no significant impediments to progress besides Stuxnet
Again, this all assumes that Mossad is not lying. These are the requirements just as a matter of logic. If you don't have all these elements, you can't claim that Mossad's statements prove that Stuxnet was effective at significantly delaying Iran. At best, you have (2), but without (1), (3), and (4), that proves nothing.
This doesn't add up. Russian scientists are extremely concerned about Iran's lax attitude towards nuclear safety issues (note plural). Against this backdrop we're supposed to be able to read tea leaves from a captured virus and determine the level of damage it did to a shoddily-operated highly-secret massively-complicated nuclear plant?
Head of Mossad and Hillary Clinton both announced:
"that they believed Iran’s efforts had been set back by several years."
(from the very NYT article)
And no less than the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:
"Iran's enemies used computer code to make "limited" problems for centrifuges involved in uranium enrichment at some of its nuclear sites, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Monday"
All these stories say the same thing: Natanz suffered a major setback, and various researchers suspect Stuxnet played a role. Here's what I think: Natanz suffered a major setback, and the role Stuxnet played was to provide a smokescreen for the actual sabotage. I have no evidence to support my take, but then, there's not much evidence for the alternative take.
I also think it's plausible that Ahmedinijad (who, remember, is not necessarily a key player in Iranian nuclear politics) or his handlers might play along with a bogus Stuxnet story if it suits the narrative; for instance, if humdrum human sabotage dealt a much greater blow to their plans than has been acknowledged, Iran might prefer the "virus cost us a few months" story to the "we're back to square one" story.
I don't know about your theory, but I agree you do have to notice that Iran wants to be considered a serious threat to increase their global bargaining position. Therefor, they have an incentive to publicize the "sophisticated cyberweapon" angle.
a) Iran send periodic letters as updates to the IAEA
b) The IAEA confirm the reported numbers through on-the-ground inspections.
The reason why Iran had to eventually confirm production problems is because the IAEA was reporting centrifuges being replaced and production numbers steadily declining to a halt.
The best report that ties all this together with Stuxnet is this one:
Comments
Israel bought itself a few more years of a nuke-free Iran.
Do we actually know that? Is there any evidence that this delayed the program by "years" rather than a few months?
Seems like they really messed them up.
According to Western intelligence reports, Russian scientists warned the Kremlin that they could be facing "another Chernobyl" if they were forced to comply with Iran's tight deadline to activate the complex this summer.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8262...
I am really confused. I thought the goal of Stuxnet was to delay the production of Iranian enrichment efforts at Natanz. Not to delay a civilian reactor at Bushehr, which is hundreds of miles away.
Assuming the Telegraph report is correct, I don't see how this tells us anything about how effective Stuxnet was at delaying enrichment efforts.
What evidence would you accept
I'll accept anything, but I'll give more credence to some sources than others.
But this seems backward. If there is no evidence that Stuxnet was effective at significantly delaying Iranian production, then people should stop saying that there is. My willingness to accept evidence really shouldn't have anything to do with it.
I'm asking because it's unlikely http://presstv.ir is going host an article saying that Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear bomb has been delayed.
Mossad is saying that Iran doesn't possess the capability to build a nuclear bomb before 2015 and it says attacking Iran would be unwise [1]. Can you think of any reason why they would be saying this unless they believed it to be true?
[1. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/07/132525.html]
I'm asking because it's unlikely http://presstv.ir is going host an article saying that Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear bomb has been delayed.
True, but that doesn't mean we should accept every claim as true.
Can you think of any reason why they would be saying this unless they believed it to be true?
What? This doesn't tell us anything about the effectiveness of Stuxnet. Even if they did, intelligence services have a nasty habit of exaggerating their own effectiveness, so I'd find it more credible if that assessment came from another Israeli government organization or another nation's intelligence service altogether.
Even if they did, intelligence services have a nasty habit of exaggerating their own effectiveness
This is where we disagree (I also don't know where this perception comes from). In no way is it in Israel's best interest to do an about-face on their assessment of the time frame for a nuclear Iran unless they had good evidence that indeed Iran's capability to obtain nuclear weapons was severely diminished. Israel has been trying to convince the international community that Iran has been on the cusp of nuclear weapons for the past two years.
You're arguing that the organization Mossad is acting irrationally. What benefit does Mossad exaggerating their effectiveness bring Israel?
You're arguing that the organization Mossad is acting irrationally.
No, I'm arguing that Mossad's claims about when Iran will have a weapon tell us nothing about the effectiveness of Stuxnet. This is a matter of logic.
I also don't know where this perception comes from
Reading books about intelligence services...like Legacy of Ashes http://www.amazon.com/Legacy-Ashes-History-Tim-Weiner/dp/038...
Beyond that, this is really basic systems theory. Intelligence service oversight, at least in the US, is very lax. The people doing oversight know a lot less about operations than the people being overseen. So when they screw up, they can spin their nominal bosses so that no one gets fired or goes to jail. It is really hard to keep secret and highly compartmentalized organizations honest. The principal agent problem is a big deal.
> This is a matter of logic.
Which brings me to my question above: what evidence would you accept? I agree there is no concrete link (just as there is no concrete link between Israel and Stuxnet), but Iran is not going to a) announce their nuclear weapons program and b) detail how far Stuxnet has set them back.
> So when they screw up, they can spin their nominal bosses so that no one gets fired or goes to jail. It is really hard to keep secret and highly compartmentalized organizations honest.
I guess we just disagree on the reasons Mossad is making these statements. It makes no sense to me why Mossad would subject Israel to threat of annihilation in order to make Mossad leaders look good.
Let's assume Mossad isn't behaving pettily. Why would they make these statements unless they believed them to be true?
At the very least, to make a Mossad claim plausible, you'd need to have:
(1) a statement by Mossad issued before Stuxnet was released forecasting that Iran would have a weapon by time T_0
(2) a statement by Mossad issued after Stuxnet was released forecasting that Iran would have a weapon by time T_1
(3) T_1 larger than T_0 by at least a year
(4) a statement by Mossad claiming that there were no significant impediments to progress besides Stuxnet
Again, this all assumes that Mossad is not lying. These are the requirements just as a matter of logic. If you don't have all these elements, you can't claim that Mossad's statements prove that Stuxnet was effective at significantly delaying Iran. At best, you have (2), but without (1), (3), and (4), that proves nothing.
To add another source, John Bolton said last August that Israel had 'a week' to attack Iran as the nuclear fuel would be ready to load at that point:
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/08/17/israel-weeks-end-...
That timeframe has now been extended from 'a week' to 2014+ (according to the NYT quoting both Mossad chief and Clinton)
What happen between these two statements to shift the timeframe estimates so dramatically? Stuxnet.
1) According to the Wikileaks cables, Israel's spy agency Mossad's latest claims foreshadowed that Iran would be nuclear armed by 2011.
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/159244.html
2) Iran not able to build nuclear bomb before 2015
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/07/132525.html
3) 2015 > 2011
4) Israel refuses to take credit for stuxnet. So this is impossible.
This doesn't add up. Russian scientists are extremely concerned about Iran's lax attitude towards nuclear safety issues (note plural). Against this backdrop we're supposed to be able to read tea leaves from a captured virus and determine the level of damage it did to a shoddily-operated highly-secret massively-complicated nuclear plant?
The source on the disruption to the nuclear program wasn't from analyzing the worm, it was from:
Three UN diplomats who were sources to an AP story:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101122/ap_on_re_eu/iran_nuclear...
A "former top IAEA official":
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11...
Iran stopped all uranium production, according to official IAEA report:
http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Ir...
IAEA again:
http://au.news.yahoo.com/world/a/-/world/8378260/iran-tempor...
Head of Mossad and Hillary Clinton both announced:
"that they believed Iran’s efforts had been set back by several years."
(from the very NYT article)
And no less than the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:
"Iran's enemies used computer code to make "limited" problems for centrifuges involved in uranium enrichment at some of its nuclear sites, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Monday"
http://israelinsider.net/profiles/blogs/ahmadinejad-those-wh...
but he would say 'limited', wouldn't he. Afterall two weeks earlier they were vehemently denying that Stuxnet had any effect.
All these stories say the same thing: Natanz suffered a major setback, and various researchers suspect Stuxnet played a role. Here's what I think: Natanz suffered a major setback, and the role Stuxnet played was to provide a smokescreen for the actual sabotage. I have no evidence to support my take, but then, there's not much evidence for the alternative take.
I also think it's plausible that Ahmedinijad (who, remember, is not necessarily a key player in Iranian nuclear politics) or his handlers might play along with a bogus Stuxnet story if it suits the narrative; for instance, if humdrum human sabotage dealt a much greater blow to their plans than has been acknowledged, Iran might prefer the "virus cost us a few months" story to the "we're back to square one" story.
I don't know about your theory, but I agree you do have to notice that Iran wants to be considered a serious threat to increase their global bargaining position. Therefor, they have an incentive to publicize the "sophisticated cyberweapon" angle.
The IAEA report numbers are from two sources:
a) Iran send periodic letters as updates to the IAEA b) The IAEA confirm the reported numbers through on-the-ground inspections.
The reason why Iran had to eventually confirm production problems is because the IAEA was reporting centrifuges being replaced and production numbers steadily declining to a halt.
The best report that ties all this together with Stuxnet is this one:
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/did-stuxnet-take-...