All these stories say the same thing: Natanz suffered a major setback, and various researchers suspect Stuxnet played a role. Here's what I think: Natanz suffered a major setback, and the role Stuxnet played was to provide a smokescreen for the actual sabotage. I have no evidence to support my take, but then, there's not much evidence for the alternative take.
I also think it's plausible that Ahmedinijad (who, remember, is not necessarily a key player in Iranian nuclear politics) or his handlers might play along with a bogus Stuxnet story if it suits the narrative; for instance, if humdrum human sabotage dealt a much greater blow to their plans than has been acknowledged, Iran might prefer the "virus cost us a few months" story to the "we're back to square one" story.
I don't know about your theory, but I agree you do have to notice that Iran wants to be considered a serious threat to increase their global bargaining position. Therefor, they have an incentive to publicize the "sophisticated cyberweapon" angle.
a) Iran send periodic letters as updates to the IAEA
b) The IAEA confirm the reported numbers through on-the-ground inspections.
The reason why Iran had to eventually confirm production problems is because the IAEA was reporting centrifuges being replaced and production numbers steadily declining to a halt.
The best report that ties all this together with Stuxnet is this one:
Comments
All these stories say the same thing: Natanz suffered a major setback, and various researchers suspect Stuxnet played a role. Here's what I think: Natanz suffered a major setback, and the role Stuxnet played was to provide a smokescreen for the actual sabotage. I have no evidence to support my take, but then, there's not much evidence for the alternative take.
I also think it's plausible that Ahmedinijad (who, remember, is not necessarily a key player in Iranian nuclear politics) or his handlers might play along with a bogus Stuxnet story if it suits the narrative; for instance, if humdrum human sabotage dealt a much greater blow to their plans than has been acknowledged, Iran might prefer the "virus cost us a few months" story to the "we're back to square one" story.
I don't know about your theory, but I agree you do have to notice that Iran wants to be considered a serious threat to increase their global bargaining position. Therefor, they have an incentive to publicize the "sophisticated cyberweapon" angle.
The IAEA report numbers are from two sources:
a) Iran send periodic letters as updates to the IAEA b) The IAEA confirm the reported numbers through on-the-ground inspections.
The reason why Iran had to eventually confirm production problems is because the IAEA was reporting centrifuges being replaced and production numbers steadily declining to a halt.
The best report that ties all this together with Stuxnet is this one:
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/did-stuxnet-take-...