If these were intentional and central parts of the legislation, how do we square that with predictions that the ACA would be crippled if SCOTUS were to decide the other way, due to unaffordable premiums?
I guess it depends on what you mean by "predictions that the ACA would be crippled". Certainly states which chose not to setup their own exchanges and not to tax businesses in order to subsidize healthcare would have much less universal healthcare. Likewise, states that chose to setup their own exchanges and provide subsidies through taxation would see much more universal healthcare. Citizens would continue to benefit from freedom of movement between states in the union, and at least we could sleep at night knowing the judiciary is marginally beholden to the laws of the land as they are actually written.
We're talking about the Solicitor General of Indiana who filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners [1] -- these are states whose representatives decided they did not want the subsidies, now having those subsidies forced upon them by an outright red-lining of the law of the land under a novel "broader context theory". Personally, that's terrifying to me. The amicus brief is quite well written and summarizes the counter-argument quite well if you're interested in actually hearing a reasonable argument of both sides (rather than the typical political commentary, which is irrelevant to the actual case at hand)
Next perhaps we'll be talking about the "broader context" of the CFAA when the Feds want to expand the scope of hacking charges, or perhaps the "broader context" of mandatory sentencing minimums. I'm sure there's a "broader context" to go along with just about any ideological ax that may presently need grinding, regardless of the ideological slant of the ax grinder.
Your last paragraph puts it in perspective very well I think.
In his blog, Fisher says he was relieved the court didn't use the Chevron approach, but it seems like that would be preferable to red-lining the law as you say. Do you know why he said that?
EDIT: Nope, nevermind, Fisher didn't say that. Don't know where I read it.
The problem with Chevron is then it's left open for different administrations to interpret the statue differently. So I think Chevron wasn't really seen as an option in this case.
But wouldn't that be true all instances where the court invokes chevron? Including Cevron v. NRDC itself? If that's the case, it seems to me that administrative deference is really just a license for govt. agencies to interpret laws however they see fit (within bounds), in which case isn't that as dangerous as the court's new "broader context" precedent?
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If these were intentional and central parts of the legislation, how do we square that with predictions that the ACA would be crippled if SCOTUS were to decide the other way, due to unaffordable premiums?
I guess it depends on what you mean by "predictions that the ACA would be crippled". Certainly states which chose not to setup their own exchanges and not to tax businesses in order to subsidize healthcare would have much less universal healthcare. Likewise, states that chose to setup their own exchanges and provide subsidies through taxation would see much more universal healthcare. Citizens would continue to benefit from freedom of movement between states in the union, and at least we could sleep at night knowing the judiciary is marginally beholden to the laws of the land as they are actually written.
We're talking about the Solicitor General of Indiana who filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners [1] -- these are states whose representatives decided they did not want the subsidies, now having those subsidies forced upon them by an outright red-lining of the law of the land under a novel "broader context theory". Personally, that's terrifying to me. The amicus brief is quite well written and summarizes the counter-argument quite well if you're interested in actually hearing a reasonable argument of both sides (rather than the typical political commentary, which is irrelevant to the actual case at hand)
Next perhaps we'll be talking about the "broader context" of the CFAA when the Feds want to expand the scope of hacking charges, or perhaps the "broader context" of mandatory sentencing minimums. I'm sure there's a "broader context" to go along with just about any ideological ax that may presently need grinding, regardless of the ideological slant of the ax grinder.
[1] - http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supr...
Your last paragraph puts it in perspective very well I think.
In his blog, Fisher says he was relieved the court didn't use the Chevron approach, but it seems like that would be preferable to red-lining the law as you say. Do you know why he said that?
EDIT: Nope, nevermind, Fisher didn't say that. Don't know where I read it.
The problem with Chevron is then it's left open for different administrations to interpret the statue differently. So I think Chevron wasn't really seen as an option in this case.
But wouldn't that be true all instances where the court invokes chevron? Including Cevron v. NRDC itself? If that's the case, it seems to me that administrative deference is really just a license for govt. agencies to interpret laws however they see fit (within bounds), in which case isn't that as dangerous as the court's new "broader context" precedent?
I assume because more states were supposed to set up exchanges.