That's what I assumed (but I wondered if there was some other advantage I was missing).
Are not all the ciphers breakable post collection anyways? Is it fair to say that this is effectively for the purpose of blanket non-targeted surveillance?
Where by having the keys in their possession it gives them a shortcut for bulk analysis and saving CPU time that would otherwise be spent breaking encryption.
And a cpu-processing-savings advantage justified cyber-attacking a foreign civilian corporation?
My understanding was that the A5/1 attack (and massive rainbow table) not only relies on known plaintext but also requires you to get the _start_ of the communication.
Comments
That's what I assumed (but I wondered if there was some other advantage I was missing).
Are not all the ciphers breakable post collection anyways? Is it fair to say that this is effectively for the purpose of blanket non-targeted surveillance? Where by having the keys in their possession it gives them a shortcut for bulk analysis and saving CPU time that would otherwise be spent breaking encryption.
And a cpu-processing-savings advantage justified cyber-attacking a foreign civilian corporation?
With the keys, you can do data collection now, and cracking later. You can do mass interceptions and then decide which calls you want to look at.
Do the attacks on A5/1 require known plaintext? I was under the impression that they do not.
My understanding was that the A5/1 attack (and massive rainbow table) not only relies on known plaintext but also requires you to get the _start_ of the communication.