You don't xor the RNG to itself - why would you do that? That's not safe if the RNG is backdoored. (Never xor dependent streams together!)
Instead you just xor all the random sources you can find together, and use that final value as the random value. Even if you xor a well known value into your random value you have no in any way harmed the randomness of your existing value - it's still random. So the hardware RNG can never make it worse.
And you keep saying 'bps' - bits per second, which makes no sense in this context. The goal is not to increase the throughput of the random stream by using a hardware generator (you might reduce cpu usage, but that's not the goal), the goal is simply better random values.
Any vendor of hardware RNGs can easily and secretly be forced to build in a backdoor (including the one we're discussing here, as you kinda need to trust that these tiny little microchips do what they claim to do). Actually, selling fake TRNGs would be a low cost, high reward excercise for any intelligence agency anyway.
Corrupted TRNGs don't make things worse, but also not better, and you keep depending on your existing entropy sources, whatever their quality may be.
Therefore providing computers with TRNGs made by Intel etc. would only create a false sense of security.
I think you majorly underestimate the "easily" part. You can make a pattern with your RNG, but once mixed it's pretty useless. Making one that can handle that is not in the slightest easy.
would only create a false sense of security.
You are assuming that your only adversary is the chip maker, but this type of RNG (if it were even possible to make it) would still be helpful in the other 99.99% of uses for randomness.
Comments
I don't think you have understood this.
You don't xor the RNG to itself - why would you do that? That's not safe if the RNG is backdoored. (Never xor dependent streams together!)
Instead you just xor all the random sources you can find together, and use that final value as the random value. Even if you xor a well known value into your random value you have no in any way harmed the randomness of your existing value - it's still random. So the hardware RNG can never make it worse.
And you keep saying 'bps' - bits per second, which makes no sense in this context. The goal is not to increase the throughput of the random stream by using a hardware generator (you might reduce cpu usage, but that's not the goal), the goal is simply better random values.
Any vendor of hardware RNGs can easily and secretly be forced to build in a backdoor (including the one we're discussing here, as you kinda need to trust that these tiny little microchips do what they claim to do). Actually, selling fake TRNGs would be a low cost, high reward excercise for any intelligence agency anyway.
Corrupted TRNGs don't make things worse, but also not better, and you keep depending on your existing entropy sources, whatever their quality may be.
Therefore providing computers with TRNGs made by Intel etc. would only create a false sense of security.
I think you majorly underestimate the "easily" part. You can make a pattern with your RNG, but once mixed it's pretty useless. Making one that can handle that is not in the slightest easy.
You are assuming that your only adversary is the chip maker, but this type of RNG (if it were even possible to make it) would still be helpful in the other 99.99% of uses for randomness.