I'm reading these blogged opinions on DNSSEC and DANE and I notice that they never state the problem(s) that these "solutions" are meant to address. At least not explicitly.
Somehow I doubt it, but if by chance there is only one true problem being addressed and that problem is simply how do we authenticate another computer as being who we believe her to be, then my second question is: what is wrong with SSH authentication?
You need some secure, out-of-band, communication means to transfer the key fingerprint to be able to verify it. The whole aim of the CA structure is so I don't need to somehow find a secure means to contact Amazon to verify their key fingerprint prior to first connecting to their website.
I once explained PKI to someone in their 70's who grew up without the personal computer and at one point they stopped me and asked "Why don't they just publish their public key in the newspaper or some directory like a telephone book?"
Later, as an experiment I printed a public key and then used OCR to reproduce it electronically.
Of course a key intended for www usage can also be retrieved over SSH, after the sending computer is authenticated (via SSH authentication). I have also done this, again as an experiment.
What I mean is that SSH and WWW have very different usage patterns.
I guess it is technically possible to verify every TLS certificate out-of-band. But would you really be willing to do that for every TLS-enabled web site you connect to? And even if you were willing to do that, the average user would never do it.
Comments
I'm reading these blogged opinions on DNSSEC and DANE and I notice that they never state the problem(s) that these "solutions" are meant to address. At least not explicitly.
Somehow I doubt it, but if by chance there is only one true problem being addressed and that problem is simply how do we authenticate another computer as being who we believe her to be, then my second question is: what is wrong with SSH authentication?
You need some secure, out-of-band, communication means to transfer the key fingerprint to be able to verify it. The whole aim of the CA structure is so I don't need to somehow find a secure means to contact Amazon to verify their key fingerprint prior to first connecting to their website.
What if I do not want to transfer the key over an insecure network of computer networks that are trivial to tamper with?
What if I would prefer to look up or obtain the key via some other means (that I deem more trustworthy that the internet)?
What key are you referring to here? The CA’s root certificate?
SSH authentication works fine.
It does. But as we all know that model can’t just be lifted over to WWW.
Note sure what "lifted over" means exactly.
I once explained PKI to someone in their 70's who grew up without the personal computer and at one point they stopped me and asked "Why don't they just publish their public key in the newspaper or some directory like a telephone book?"
Later, as an experiment I printed a public key and then used OCR to reproduce it electronically.
Of course a key intended for www usage can also be retrieved over SSH, after the sending computer is authenticated (via SSH authentication). I have also done this, again as an experiment.
What I mean is that SSH and WWW have very different usage patterns.
I guess it is technically possible to verify every TLS certificate out-of-band. But would you really be willing to do that for every TLS-enabled web site you connect to? And even if you were willing to do that, the average user would never do it.