One of the requirements for the attack is partial plaintext control. This is feasible if you're running malicious JavaScript in the user's browser.
So what you do is generate an HTTP request that, taken together with the SSL MAC, will align on a block boundary. Then you're guaranteed to have one full block of padding.
It might sound difficult to pull this off with multiple unknowns (other cookies, user agent string, etc.), but in practice it would be easy. You could make sure things line up correctly just by incrementing your packet length by one byte at a time until you see the record size jump by a block.
Comments
One of the requirements for the attack is partial plaintext control. This is feasible if you're running malicious JavaScript in the user's browser.
So what you do is generate an HTTP request that, taken together with the SSL MAC, will align on a block boundary. Then you're guaranteed to have one full block of padding.
It might sound difficult to pull this off with multiple unknowns (other cookies, user agent string, etc.), but in practice it would be easy. You could make sure things line up correctly just by incrementing your packet length by one byte at a time until you see the record size jump by a block.