Perhaps I'm missing something obvious, but I don't understand. What's so great about not having to store the key pair on disk? After all, this is a file encryption software. Its job is to store data on disk. In fact, it already adds a bunch of headers to every encrypted file. Why not just grab 128 random bits from /dev/urandom, make it the private key, encrypt it with the passphrase as all the other programs do, and stick the encrypted key in the header? It will only add a few dozen bytes to the header, which is peanuts.
This comment is a perfect example of why encryption is mostly not used at all. (Which is far worse than any given vuln). There's kind of a perverse all-or-nothing attitude where the goal is to poke at any possible flaw in a system as proof that it is completely worthless. What's wrong with there being different tradeoffs between security and convenience? The insistence on all-or-nothing solutions has resulted in the powers that be knowing almost everything about almost everyone in our society, because almost no one wants to deal with the trouble of "completely secure" encryption.
If there are no media with your secret key, it can't be stolen.
Of course, if your computer is cracked into, or your adversaries are using rubber-hose cryptanalysis, all bets are off. But this scenario is usually less probable than having your physical wallet or keychain stolen.
Comments
Perhaps I'm missing something obvious, but I don't understand. What's so great about not having to store the key pair on disk? After all, this is a file encryption software. Its job is to store data on disk. In fact, it already adds a bunch of headers to every encrypted file. Why not just grab 128 random bits from /dev/urandom, make it the private key, encrypt it with the passphrase as all the other programs do, and stick the encrypted key in the header? It will only add a few dozen bytes to the header, which is peanuts.
I think so you can use it from any computer anywhere with just the passphrase to derive the key and don't need to carry and secure a file.
If you're entering your passphrase on systems you don't control, it's already game over for that passphrase.
This comment is a perfect example of why encryption is mostly not used at all. (Which is far worse than any given vuln). There's kind of a perverse all-or-nothing attitude where the goal is to poke at any possible flaw in a system as proof that it is completely worthless. What's wrong with there being different tradeoffs between security and convenience? The insistence on all-or-nothing solutions has resulted in the powers that be knowing almost everything about almost everyone in our society, because almost no one wants to deal with the trouble of "completely secure" encryption.
If there are no media with your secret key, it can't be stolen.
Of course, if your computer is cracked into, or your adversaries are using rubber-hose cryptanalysis, all bets are off. But this scenario is usually less probable than having your physical wallet or keychain stolen.