There are plenty of rational players who would desire the downfall of Bitcoin.
Then game theory is pretty useful model. Players are rational, after all. Thats what's game theory is about.
Governments may not want currencies they can't control.
Makes perfect sense. But we're discussing 51% attack. Would a miner with 51% of hashrate willingly help a government(and why would he)?
Or, would a government simply try to legislate bitcoin out of existence? I would say that the latter is more likely than the former.
And now that there's a single pool with >51% of the CPU power, the difficulty of a hostile takeover just went way, way down.
Remember, it is not a single entity. It is a pool. And, in fact, ghash.io share is down to 39%.
all the CIA has to do is threaten a few people and say
I do agree with this point. One of the strongest points of bitcoin is decentralization. We should keep bitcoin as decentralized as possible. But I would say ghash.io having 51% is a minor obstacle.
Then game theory is pretty useful model. Players are rational, after all. Thats what's game theory is about.
Sorry, I wasn't clear enough. My argument is that the people citing game theory as a reason Bitcoin players had an incentive to avoid a 51%+ scenario kept assuming that all players wanted Bitcoin to succeed.
(However, as a former cognitive neuroscientist, I think it's mistaken to assume that people always act rationally. Check out the literature on the ultimatum game or anchoring effects in prospect theory (for which Kahneman got the Nobel prize) to see examples of people acting irrationally in a sytematic, biased way.)
Would a miner with 51% of hashrate willingly help a government(and why would he)?
Who said anything about being willing? My example suggested threats, which is way more likely than cooperation.
Remember, it is not a single entity. It is a pool. And, in fact, ghash.io share is down to 39%.
Yes, but the people running the pool have the keys to the kingdom as long the pool members don't know. So, more subtle perversion has a good chance of lasting a while, while gross manipulation is more likely to cause pool members to switch.
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Then game theory is pretty useful model. Players are rational, after all. Thats what's game theory is about.
Makes perfect sense. But we're discussing 51% attack. Would a miner with 51% of hashrate willingly help a government(and why would he)?
Or, would a government simply try to legislate bitcoin out of existence? I would say that the latter is more likely than the former.
Remember, it is not a single entity. It is a pool. And, in fact, ghash.io share is down to 39%.
I do agree with this point. One of the strongest points of bitcoin is decentralization. We should keep bitcoin as decentralized as possible. But I would say ghash.io having 51% is a minor obstacle.
Sorry, I wasn't clear enough. My argument is that the people citing game theory as a reason Bitcoin players had an incentive to avoid a 51%+ scenario kept assuming that all players wanted Bitcoin to succeed.
(However, as a former cognitive neuroscientist, I think it's mistaken to assume that people always act rationally. Check out the literature on the ultimatum game or anchoring effects in prospect theory (for which Kahneman got the Nobel prize) to see examples of people acting irrationally in a sytematic, biased way.)
Who said anything about being willing? My example suggested threats, which is way more likely than cooperation.
Yes, but the people running the pool have the keys to the kingdom as long the pool members don't know. So, more subtle perversion has a good chance of lasting a while, while gross manipulation is more likely to cause pool members to switch.
Players are rational, after all. Thats what's game theory is about.
Bitcoin players aren't rational. Karpeles stood to earn way more by not manipulating the market. He did so anyway and bankrupted his own company.
Game theory assumes all players are smart.