This article makes a good argument for simplicity. Yet two of the topmost examples-- that simplicity in the MIG-25 made it fast, and that simplicity in the transmission of Soviet tanks makes them more easily repaired, even if they're harder to drive-- fly in the face of a specific tactical approach developed by the US Air Force during the Korean War.
The OODA loop concept breaks down decisions into a cycle of Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action [1]. The theory was developed by a John Boyd, who flew F-86 aircraft against faster and more maneuverable Mig-15s during the Korean war. Nevertheless, his unit supposedly achieved a 10:1 kill ratio [2].
He attributed their success to American pilots' ability to make and act on decisions faster. "Time is the dominant parameter. The pilot who goes through the OODA cycle in the shortest time prevails because his opponent is caught responding to situations that have already changed." [3]
And in part he attributed this ability to the F-86 being easier on the pilot:
During his research he found that Fatigue was also a factor. He and his pilots were flying F-86’s and although they were slower and less maneuverable than the Mig 15’s they were flying against, The F-86 was fully hydraulically controlled and the Mig 15 was only hydraulically assisted. This meant that Boyd’s pilots could operate their aircraft with easy and gentle manipulation of the controls, while the Mig pilots had to work harder to maneuver their aircraft. Boyd found that the more his pilots maneuvered and the longer a dogfight persisted the more fatigued the Mig pilots became and the slower their reaction time became until the F-86 pilots were able to maneuver their aircraft into a position of dominance. [2]
The other big issue which was not fully understood until the Americans had captured some Soviet aircraft was that the MiGs were not built to be used regularly for training and other flights. The Soviet aircraft simply could not withstand the number and type of flight hours required to train a pilot to the level of proficiency that the western allies achieved. This is best demonstrated by India's experiences with the MiG-21 and General Dynamics F-16, where using both aircraft similarly has proven to be very dangerous to the MiG pilots.[1]
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This article makes a good argument for simplicity. Yet two of the topmost examples-- that simplicity in the MIG-25 made it fast, and that simplicity in the transmission of Soviet tanks makes them more easily repaired, even if they're harder to drive-- fly in the face of a specific tactical approach developed by the US Air Force during the Korean War.
The OODA loop concept breaks down decisions into a cycle of Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action [1]. The theory was developed by a John Boyd, who flew F-86 aircraft against faster and more maneuverable Mig-15s during the Korean war. Nevertheless, his unit supposedly achieved a 10:1 kill ratio [2].
He attributed their success to American pilots' ability to make and act on decisions faster. "Time is the dominant parameter. The pilot who goes through the OODA cycle in the shortest time prevails because his opponent is caught responding to situations that have already changed." [3]
And in part he attributed this ability to the F-86 being easier on the pilot:
During his research he found that Fatigue was also a factor. He and his pilots were flying F-86’s and although they were slower and less maneuverable than the Mig 15’s they were flying against, The F-86 was fully hydraulically controlled and the Mig 15 was only hydraulically assisted. This meant that Boyd’s pilots could operate their aircraft with easy and gentle manipulation of the controls, while the Mig pilots had to work harder to maneuver their aircraft. Boyd found that the more his pilots maneuvered and the longer a dogfight persisted the more fatigued the Mig pilots became and the slower their reaction time became until the F-86 pilots were able to maneuver their aircraft into a position of dominance. [2]
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OODA_loop
[2] http://www.tacticalresponse.com/d/node/226
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)...
The other big issue which was not fully understood until the Americans had captured some Soviet aircraft was that the MiGs were not built to be used regularly for training and other flights. The Soviet aircraft simply could not withstand the number and type of flight hours required to train a pilot to the level of proficiency that the western allies achieved. This is best demonstrated by India's experiences with the MiG-21 and General Dynamics F-16, where using both aircraft similarly has proven to be very dangerous to the MiG pilots.[1]
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikoyan-Gurevich_MiG-21#India
And yet, despite the superiority of the air stuff, the ground war didn't go so well--that being the main focus of the article it would seem.