If you store an image with executable code in it on Dropbox via Truecrypt, how many times will you potentially run it out of that image?
Again: we are talking about properties that cryptographically sound systems simply don't have. And if you're using Dropbox as your backing store, and not a physical drive, there is no reason to accept those properties!
If I store a program on Dropbox, I might run it many times. Thousands? Millions to be generous? But if the attacker has to do a brute force search which relies on me executing each different tampered version of the program, that's probably too small of a number.
The reason to accept sub-optimal properties in this case is convenience. Truecrypt is popular and has a nice interface. Using it with Dropbox gives much better security than not using it with Dropbox. It's not perfect, but I still don't think we have any practical attacks against such a scenario.
I agree that having stronger crypto there is however possible and desirable.
Comments
If you store an image with executable code in it on Dropbox via Truecrypt, how many times will you potentially run it out of that image?
Again: we are talking about properties that cryptographically sound systems simply don't have. And if you're using Dropbox as your backing store, and not a physical drive, there is no reason to accept those properties!
If I store a program on Dropbox, I might run it many times. Thousands? Millions to be generous? But if the attacker has to do a brute force search which relies on me executing each different tampered version of the program, that's probably too small of a number.
The reason to accept sub-optimal properties in this case is convenience. Truecrypt is popular and has a nice interface. Using it with Dropbox gives much better security than not using it with Dropbox. It's not perfect, but I still don't think we have any practical attacks against such a scenario.
I agree that having stronger crypto there is however possible and desirable.