Am I wrong that it's easier to get code into OpenSSL
I might be wrong but the idea I have is that currently Google more or less owns OpenSSL and thus it is maybe more easy, makes more sense for them to get patches in OpenSSL and try to migrate exclusively toward OpenSSL.
Another question I have is since when the HeartBleed flaw was discovered by the Google's employee? Was it formally reported to the OpenSSL team or only to OpenSSL members working for Google? And if the other independant group of engineers had not independantly discovered the flaw would have it been disclosed as quickly as it has? Bottom line it seems to me (and I'd like to be wrong) that the current opacity of OpenSSL disserves everyone but Google.
Another question I have is since when the HeartBleed flaw was discovered by the Google's employee? Was it formally reported to the OpenSSL team or only to OpenSSL members working for Google?
I think it is generally regarded as sensible practice to disclose major problems like heartbleed that have wide ranging impact directly to the people responsible instead of a catchall "security team" address whenever possible.
Comments
I might be wrong but the idea I have is that currently Google more or less owns OpenSSL and thus it is maybe more easy, makes more sense for them to get patches in OpenSSL and try to migrate exclusively toward OpenSSL.
Another question I have is since when the HeartBleed flaw was discovered by the Google's employee? Was it formally reported to the OpenSSL team or only to OpenSSL members working for Google? And if the other independant group of engineers had not independantly discovered the flaw would have it been disclosed as quickly as it has? Bottom line it seems to me (and I'd like to be wrong) that the current opacity of OpenSSL disserves everyone but Google.
Another question I have is since when the HeartBleed flaw was discovered by the Google's employee? Was it formally reported to the OpenSSL team or only to OpenSSL members working for Google?
I think it is generally regarded as sensible practice to disclose major problems like heartbleed that have wide ranging impact directly to the people responsible instead of a catchall "security team" address whenever possible.