I gave this some thought earlier today, and expect that address space randomisation can make this bug eventually expose the server keys. You need to hit an address that has been just vacated from a (crashed) httpd worker.
Most implementations clear encryption key material on exit, but a crashed process never got to run that code.
In most systems, this will only work within the same process. Contemporary Unix kernels always allocate zeroed pages to processes, so it's impossible for a process to recover data from another unless there's a kernel bug.
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I gave this some thought earlier today, and expect that address space randomisation can make this bug eventually expose the server keys. You need to hit an address that has been just vacated from a (crashed) httpd worker.
Most implementations clear encryption key material on exit, but a crashed process never got to run that code.
In most systems, this will only work within the same process. Contemporary Unix kernels always allocate zeroed pages to processes, so it's impossible for a process to recover data from another unless there's a kernel bug.