Determination is not an issue. Any non-deterministic Turing machine has an equivalent deterministic Turing machine.
Consciousness is an issue. Indeed, if consciousness is pure computation, then its self-referencing character make it vulnerable to Gödel's incompletude theorem. However, maybe consciousness is more than mere computation — maybe it cannot be reduced to an axiomatic system. Anyway, as far as neuroscience goes, I think consciousness mostly remains a philosophical debate.
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You misinterpreted my sentence. What I meant is: "universal computation is not, in itself, a proof that a computer can understand itself". This relates to my above remark: maybe consciousness is not pure computation.
Also, a system monitoring its own status is not necessarily understanding itself.
Comments
Let us make a distinction, shall we?
Determination is not an issue. Any non-deterministic Turing machine has an equivalent deterministic Turing machine.
Consciousness is an issue. Indeed, if consciousness is pure computation, then its self-referencing character make it vulnerable to Gödel's incompletude theorem. However, maybe consciousness is more than mere computation — maybe it cannot be reduced to an axiomatic system. Anyway, as far as neuroscience goes, I think consciousness mostly remains a philosophical debate.
* * *
You misinterpreted my sentence. What I meant is: "universal computation is not, in itself, a proof that a computer can understand itself". This relates to my above remark: maybe consciousness is not pure computation.
Also, a system monitoring its own status is not necessarily understanding itself.