I at least did not intend to agree ;-) - my point is that cryptographic communication tools are kindof useless for activists unless they are used by a large number of people in general, both because otherwise they are isolated and can not actually communicate with anyone using the system (except for a few other activists), and because using the tool would make them stick out, which is why they are also indirectly somewhat useless for the general public, because part of the function of a secure cryptographic communication tool is to give the general public the benefits of the activism by making the general public help in hiding the activists. So, I guess my point kindof is that "crypto for <x>" doesn't actually work because using it marks you as <x> - secure crypto has to be used by everybody in order to provide protection to those who need it the most.

As for the fact that people who do risky things need to be a bit more cautious anyway: Well, yes, but that does not mean that they would not benefit if everyone knew which crypto tools are secure and how to use them, and in contrast to most of physical security, there really is not that much need to distinguish between "professional" and "end customer" tools - proofing your vault against bombs might be a bit more expensive than proofing it against a burglar, but secure cryptography does not need more expensive computers or anything like that.

And also no clue how you to quote here ... ;)