You would prefer to communicate in plaintext-equivalent where you think nobody can read it even though in fact everybody can over communicating in plaintext where you know everybody can read it?
I wouldn't prefer that, but I'm also not as convinced that Cryptocat is as "clearly broken" (i.e. plaintext is trivially recoverable) in its current state as a lot of people on here are. Most of the attacks that I've seen so far were against the group chat implementation, which, granted, is significant, but not against the primary component, the OTR chat.
I think it is somewhat naive to believe that any mechanism other than a one-time pad will absolutely keep your communications safe, and that it's a little dangerous to insinuate that Cryptocat leaks information about the plaintext but X or Y doesn't.
Comments
So, let me put that a bit more clearly:
You would prefer to communicate in plaintext-equivalent where you think nobody can read it even though in fact everybody can over communicating in plaintext where you know everybody can read it?
I wouldn't prefer that, but I'm also not as convinced that Cryptocat is as "clearly broken" (i.e. plaintext is trivially recoverable) in its current state as a lot of people on here are. Most of the attacks that I've seen so far were against the group chat implementation, which, granted, is significant, but not against the primary component, the OTR chat.
I think it is somewhat naive to believe that any mechanism other than a one-time pad will absolutely keep your communications safe, and that it's a little dangerous to insinuate that Cryptocat leaks information about the plaintext but X or Y doesn't.