"All processes that exist entirely in software are representable as a series of mathematical operations. Therefore, software methods are math"
This is where your argument breaks down. This is not logically sound.
Just because something is representable in some other form, does not mean it is that other form.
The interactions of subatomic particles can be represented by a series of feynman diagrams. It does not follow that interactions of subatomic particles are actually feynman diagrams.
If you want more examples, there are plenty of things in physics that are representable as interactions and models that are provably do not occur that way in the physical world :)
instead of "are representable by a series of mathematical operations", you want to say "are in fact, a series of mathematical operations "
Even then, the argument doesn't hold because they aren't patenting processes in software. They are patenting processes (which is valid), particular instances of which happen to be represented in software.
There are good arguments for why software patents should not exist. Most of them deal with abstractness of the processes or claims, not "mathiness".
It does not follow that interactions of subatomic particles are actually feynman diagrams.
Right, there you can say "ceci n'est pas une pipe" and be right. The problem with this is that software is, literally, information. And all types of information are equivalent. It's true that information requires a carrier (language, memory, hardware, whatever), but that doesn't mean it should be conflated with it. With math, numbers are no different than any other form of precise information.
"We used to think that if we knew one, we knew two, because one and one are two. We are finding that we must learn a great deal more about 'and.'" — Sir Arthur Eddington
Comments
"All processes that exist entirely in software are representable as a series of mathematical operations. Therefore, software methods are math"
This is where your argument breaks down. This is not logically sound.
Just because something is representable in some other form, does not mean it is that other form.
The interactions of subatomic particles can be represented by a series of feynman diagrams. It does not follow that interactions of subatomic particles are actually feynman diagrams.
If you want more examples, there are plenty of things in physics that are representable as interactions and models that are provably do not occur that way in the physical world :)
instead of "are representable by a series of mathematical operations", you want to say "are in fact, a series of mathematical operations "
Even then, the argument doesn't hold because they aren't patenting processes in software. They are patenting processes (which is valid), particular instances of which happen to be represented in software.
There are good arguments for why software patents should not exist. Most of them deal with abstractness of the processes or claims, not "mathiness".
Right, there you can say "ceci n'est pas une pipe" and be right. The problem with this is that software is, literally, information. And all types of information are equivalent. It's true that information requires a carrier (language, memory, hardware, whatever), but that doesn't mean it should be conflated with it. With math, numbers are no different than any other form of precise information.
Then, when someone tries to tell us that math isn't just numbers, were going to have to introduce them to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del_numbering
But wait, software is just numbers too, right? Right, which is why people can make this: http://us.metamath.org/
P.S. While you're over there, don't miss the 2+2=4 trivia: http://us.metamath.org/mpegif/mmset.html#trivia
"We used to think that if we knew one, we knew two, because one and one are two. We are finding that we must learn a great deal more about 'and.'" — Sir Arthur Eddington