"The stakes are potentially enormous, since once data is hijacked, the perpetrator can copy and then comb through any unencrypted data freely"
Apparently then, the harm amounts to:
H1. The method is a little stealthier than the NSA's other modus operandi, the badge + "national security letter" + secrecy order, and similar conduct of other state actors.
H2. The reach extends surveillance capabilities outside the attacker's territory.
On the other hand:
M1. There is no new MITM that was not possible before. Well-encrypted traffic is still opaque, and plaintext traffic is still vulnerable, regardless whether it is hijacked BGP-wise or by the on-premises tactics.
M2. This does not go unnoticed, there is no way to force affected parties to shut up about it, and like the other wiretapping, this will bring on countermeasures. It's self-limiting.
Comments
Let's assess the damage. Says the article:
"The stakes are potentially enormous, since once data is hijacked, the perpetrator can copy and then comb through any unencrypted data freely"
Apparently then, the harm amounts to:
H1. The method is a little stealthier than the NSA's other modus operandi, the badge + "national security letter" + secrecy order, and similar conduct of other state actors.
H2. The reach extends surveillance capabilities outside the attacker's territory.
On the other hand:
M1. There is no new MITM that was not possible before. Well-encrypted traffic is still opaque, and plaintext traffic is still vulnerable, regardless whether it is hijacked BGP-wise or by the on-premises tactics.
M2. This does not go unnoticed, there is no way to force affected parties to shut up about it, and like the other wiretapping, this will bring on countermeasures. It's self-limiting.