Actually, with our Private Cloud offering you pretty well can guarantee privacy by simply firewalling the virtual appliance from the rest of the world, if you would like to :)
Feel free to sign up and packet inspect the traffic!
Does AeroFS do both encryption for in-flight and at-rest data?
One of the things I didn't like about AeroFS when I last looked at it was the dependency of having Java avail on systems. I try to remove Java as much as possible and it certainly would be nice if the AeroFS client were avail in a different bundle.
The irritating part is that even though AeroFS requires Java, it has platform-dependent libraries as well, so you can't just run it on, say, an ARM machine (which is what I'm waiting for).
It's a nice way to alleviate the barrier to monetization that open-source-as-security poses. In short, instead of having lamdba user trusting 'the community' for security audits, now each user has to implement security measures.
This leaves users holding the bag. Well, it should work for you but remains subpar.
In my experience "the community" cannot be trusted for security audits, as far as most FLOSS goes. In fact if a program can be "made secure" by yourself just by firewalling it properly, I'd be more inclined to trust that measure over any FLOSS community audit.
Having said that, the idea of running software I mistrust so much that I haveto firewall it on my network is unacceptable.
If you store binaries on the system and the system can recognize them, it could change the served versions to insert malware.
This attack isn't purely theoretical. I believe Ian Goldberg and David Wagner's group at UC Berkeley demonstrated it in the 1990s against a LAN-based NFS server that was serving shared software to workstations. Instead of making the NFS server itself malicious, they raced against it to provide modified binaries that the workstations would then execute. However, if the NFS server had been malicious, it could have carried out the same attack, without directly leaking user data to the Internet.
If you could compromise workstations this way, you could then try to find another channel through which to have the workstations themselves exfiltrate data. One example might be a variant on the Telex system:
Comments
Actually, with our Private Cloud offering you pretty well can guarantee privacy by simply firewalling the virtual appliance from the rest of the world, if you would like to :)
Feel free to sign up and packet inspect the traffic!
Does AeroFS do both encryption for in-flight and at-rest data?
One of the things I didn't like about AeroFS when I last looked at it was the dependency of having Java avail on systems. I try to remove Java as much as possible and it certainly would be nice if the AeroFS client were avail in a different bundle.
The irritating part is that even though AeroFS requires Java, it has platform-dependent libraries as well, so you can't just run it on, say, an ARM machine (which is what I'm waiting for).
AeroFS in Go? =)
It's a nice way to alleviate the barrier to monetization that open-source-as-security poses. In short, instead of having lamdba user trusting 'the community' for security audits, now each user has to implement security measures.
This leaves users holding the bag. Well, it should work for you but remains subpar.
Congrats nonetheless.
In my experience "the community" cannot be trusted for security audits, as far as most FLOSS goes. In fact if a program can be "made secure" by yourself just by firewalling it properly, I'd be more inclined to trust that measure over any FLOSS community audit.
Having said that, the idea of running software I mistrust so much that I have to firewall it on my network is unacceptable.
I agree wrt security-through-community and its weaknesses. And indeed turning your guns inwards seems like the wrong move.
This is probably true. I'm trying to think other attack vectors.. not really coming up with any yet.
Slightly sad that we can't trust things on our own network now... goes and turn on firewall for individual machines on my own network
If you store binaries on the system and the system can recognize them, it could change the served versions to insert malware.
This attack isn't purely theoretical. I believe Ian Goldberg and David Wagner's group at UC Berkeley demonstrated it in the 1990s against a LAN-based NFS server that was serving shared software to workstations. Instead of making the NFS server itself malicious, they raced against it to provide modified binaries that the workstations would then execute. However, if the NFS server had been malicious, it could have carried out the same attack, without directly leaking user data to the Internet.
I guess this is a reference to that work:
https://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/endpoint-security.ht...
If you could compromise workstations this way, you could then try to find another channel through which to have the workstations themselves exfiltrate data. One example might be a variant on the Telex system:
https://telex.cc/
Instead of signaling Internet routers with requests to browse censored websites, you could signal them with the content of exfiltrated files.
The AeroFS clients are another vector. You would have to have application specific firewalling and restrict them to communicating with the server.