I also think that since this would be exploited against non-state actors as well as states changes the payouts calculations significantly. Much, if not most, of the value is derived from exploiting non-state actors (i.e. Al Qaeda) who almost certainly would not have this capability or would not be able to keep it quite if they did. By signaling to the state actor on these capabilities, they would be giving up the value of exploiting the information from the non-state actors. So, even if you believed that state actors had these capabilities, it may be better to be kept a secret between the two countries and allow low priority secrets to be exploited than to have the info publicly known and the capability lost.
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I also think that since this would be exploited against non-state actors as well as states changes the payouts calculations significantly. Much, if not most, of the value is derived from exploiting non-state actors (i.e. Al Qaeda) who almost certainly would not have this capability or would not be able to keep it quite if they did. By signaling to the state actor on these capabilities, they would be giving up the value of exploiting the information from the non-state actors. So, even if you believed that state actors had these capabilities, it may be better to be kept a secret between the two countries and allow low priority secrets to be exploited than to have the info publicly known and the capability lost.