That is indirect, and is consistently ineffective.
For example, consider hypothetical state propositions limiting when elected officials can solicit donations, or providing for specific penalties to elected officials should they fail to do certain things (eg pass a budget on time). There are many such propositions that could be popular with voters, and would certainly be unpopular with any elected official.
For that class of proposition, the ability to vote in different elected officials does not actually give the public an effective tool to get the state to support the proposition.
Comments
That is indirect, and is consistently ineffective.
For example, consider hypothetical state propositions limiting when elected officials can solicit donations, or providing for specific penalties to elected officials should they fail to do certain things (eg pass a budget on time). There are many such propositions that could be popular with voters, and would certainly be unpopular with any elected official.
For that class of proposition, the ability to vote in different elected officials does not actually give the public an effective tool to get the state to support the proposition.
And that is moving the goalposts (particularly as to the "indirect" portion), and unsupported (as to the "consistently ineffective".)
The rather special case you assert as an example, whatever merits it might have, clearly doesn't show that it is "consistently" anything.