There are certain special cases for which homomorphic cryptography should would acceptably. Blinded signatures are one example of something essentially a special case of it.
IMO, the right way to do hostproof is some combination of trusted computing (HSMs, TXT, etc.), protocols which can prove things clearly but not keep them confidential (like bitcoin -- something which used certifications to prove source code hasn't been altered and compiles to the binary you're talking to would be a great leap forward), special-cases of homomorphic crypto, and client side execution (either all the time, or for some statistically significant subset of operations, to catch cheaters eventually).
What makes you say homomorphic encryption doesn't have a chance of working? I grant you that it will be at least 15 years before a commercially viable homomorphic encryption product is released, but to say it has no chance of working is silly.
My research advisor likes to tell a story of his friend going to see Rivest give some of the first lectures on RSA circa 1977. All the systems people in the room laughed at the naivete of this young cryptographer and his hope that such an absurdly slow encryption method would gain widespread adoption.
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It actually has a chance of working.
There are certain special cases for which homomorphic cryptography should would acceptably. Blinded signatures are one example of something essentially a special case of it.
IMO, the right way to do hostproof is some combination of trusted computing (HSMs, TXT, etc.), protocols which can prove things clearly but not keep them confidential (like bitcoin -- something which used certifications to prove source code hasn't been altered and compiles to the binary you're talking to would be a great leap forward), special-cases of homomorphic crypto, and client side execution (either all the time, or for some statistically significant subset of operations, to catch cheaters eventually).
What makes you say homomorphic encryption doesn't have a chance of working? I grant you that it will be at least 15 years before a commercially viable homomorphic encryption product is released, but to say it has no chance of working is silly. My research advisor likes to tell a story of his friend going to see Rivest give some of the first lectures on RSA circa 1977. All the systems people in the room laughed at the naivete of this young cryptographer and his hope that such an absurdly slow encryption method would gain widespread adoption.
I suspect Crypton is for people writing apps now, not 15 years from now. Who knows what moral panic we'll be getting worked up about in 2025?