Indeed, but I actually kind of mis-spoke here. The question is less about having an experience to be aware of, but the ability to accurately reflect internal state.
Even humans need to learn how to read their own internal state (e.g., saying "I got mad" rather than "I felt ashamed because I wasn't living up to my picture of what a good person is, and covered up the shame with anger").
But if an LLM were to say, "I'm sad" or "I'm happy", does that actually correlate to anything? I'm OK with saying "The LLM was sad", if there is an internal state that leads to observable changes in behavior correlating with the kinds of changes in behavior humans have when they're sad. The question is, if the LLM says "I'm sad", is that because it has that internal state (self-reflection)? Or is it because that's the kind of thing a human would say in that context?
I think both are possible. I also think that between internal probes and behavioral testing, it should be possible to determine which one is closer to the truth. I'm just pointing out that "LLMs talk about their internal state" isn't proof that LLMs have self-referentiality, without additional evidence that the talk is actually related to their internal state.
But if an LLM were to say, "I'm sad" or "I'm happy", does that actually correlate to anything? I'm OK with saying "The LLM was sad", if there is an internal state that leads to observable changes in behavior correlating with the kinds of changes in behavior humans have when they're sad. The question is, if the LLM says "I'm sad", is that because it has that internal state (self-reflection)? Or is it because that's the kind of thing a human would say in that context?
If they are not trained specifically to find those internal state correlates when introspecting, I would find it quite shocking to see that introspection is an emergent behavior of LLMs
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Indeed, but I actually kind of mis-spoke here. The question is less about having an experience to be aware of, but the ability to accurately reflect internal state.
Even humans need to learn how to read their own internal state (e.g., saying "I got mad" rather than "I felt ashamed because I wasn't living up to my picture of what a good person is, and covered up the shame with anger").
But if an LLM were to say, "I'm sad" or "I'm happy", does that actually correlate to anything? I'm OK with saying "The LLM was sad", if there is an internal state that leads to observable changes in behavior correlating with the kinds of changes in behavior humans have when they're sad. The question is, if the LLM says "I'm sad", is that because it has that internal state (self-reflection)? Or is it because that's the kind of thing a human would say in that context?
I think both are possible. I also think that between internal probes and behavioral testing, it should be possible to determine which one is closer to the truth. I'm just pointing out that "LLMs talk about their internal state" isn't proof that LLMs have self-referentiality, without additional evidence that the talk is actually related to their internal state.
If they are not trained specifically to find those internal state correlates when introspecting, I would find it quite shocking to see that introspection is an emergent behavior of LLMs