The vastly preferable situation was to have redundant wiring that properly complied with regulations, which was retrofitted in an airworthiness directive (safety recall) after the accident.
They also required engine software that detected the sudden increase in speed associated with a shaft break and automatically cut fuel.
Sort of. Rolls Royce voluntarily developed this software modification in response to learning that their reasoning about it never being able to happen was incorrect and being unable to concretely account for how it happened. EASA, which was not even the relevant safety authority for this incident, upon learning of its existence, only then required it to be installed on all A380 Trent 900 engines.
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The vastly preferable situation was to have redundant wiring that properly complied with regulations, which was retrofitted in an airworthiness directive (safety recall) after the accident.
They also required engine software that detected the sudden increase in speed associated with a shaft break and automatically cut fuel.
Sort of. Rolls Royce voluntarily developed this software modification in response to learning that their reasoning about it never being able to happen was incorrect and being unable to concretely account for how it happened. EASA, which was not even the relevant safety authority for this incident, upon learning of its existence, only then required it to be installed on all A380 Trent 900 engines.