The severity of nuclear power plant failures is also decreasing.
"Radiation effects from the Fukushima nuclear accident"
"A June 2012 Stanford University study estimated, using a linear no-threshold model, that the radioactivity release from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant could cause 130 deaths from cancer globally (the lower bound for the estimate being 15 and the upper bound 1100) and 199 cancer cases in total (the lower bound being 24 and the upper bound 1800), most of which are estimated to occur in Japan. Radiation exposure to workers at the plant was projected to result in 2 to 12 deaths. However, a December 2012 UNSCEAR statement to the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety advised that "because of the great uncertainties in risk estimates at very low doses, UNSCEAR does not recommend multiplying very low doses by large numbers of individuals to estimate numbers of radiation-induced health effects within a population exposed to incremental doses at levels equivalent to or lower than natural background levels.""
The power plant is in a very rural area with estimations of 100 people per square kilometer. Tokai Daini is in an area with approx 10 times the people compared to Fukushima. It’s only 8 meters above sea level and it’s also in risk of a tsunami in general. From my point of view that’s not an argument for the safety of nuclear power but more a “it didn’t happen this time”
It's argument for the safety of nuclear power, because 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami (Earthquake was the most powerful ever recorded in Japan, and the fourth most powerful recorded in the world since modern seismography began in 1900) caused over 15,000 deaths. In contrast the meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant started by the tsunami caused much less deaths.
Would a similar earthquake and tsunami cause 150 000 deaths, if it happen near Tōkai?
Nuclear operators studied the reasons for meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi NPP (failure to restore cooling after wide spread destruction of infrastructure around nuclear power plant and flooding of backup diesel generators underground) and have prepared steps to prevent it in other power plants (aditional backup diesel generators mounted in higher places, helicopter transport of spare cooling equipment when roads are destroyed).
"As an example, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) initiated an assessment of the country’s 56 nuclear power reactors as well as the 2 EPR reactors under construction. The ASN then prescribed the implementation of both fixed and mobile equipment that could potentially prevent a large release, including high-resistance diesel generators and pumps able to function in extreme scenarios such as major earthquakes or flooding. The availability of alternative sources of water for cooling was also prescribed under the same conditions. In addition, the ASN required a back-up plan including rapid action force groups that can be on site within 24 hours with light equipment and within three days with heavy equipment, using transportation means such as helicopters, and that can operate in a severely disrupted environment."
Comments
The severity of nuclear power plant failures is also decreasing.
"Radiation effects from the Fukushima nuclear accident"
"A June 2012 Stanford University study estimated, using a linear no-threshold model, that the radioactivity release from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant could cause 130 deaths from cancer globally (the lower bound for the estimate being 15 and the upper bound 1100) and 199 cancer cases in total (the lower bound being 24 and the upper bound 1800), most of which are estimated to occur in Japan. Radiation exposure to workers at the plant was projected to result in 2 to 12 deaths. However, a December 2012 UNSCEAR statement to the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety advised that "because of the great uncertainties in risk estimates at very low doses, UNSCEAR does not recommend multiplying very low doses by large numbers of individuals to estimate numbers of radiation-induced health effects within a population exposed to incremental doses at levels equivalent to or lower than natural background levels.""
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation_effects_from_the_Fuk...
The power plant is in a very rural area with estimations of 100 people per square kilometer. Tokai Daini is in an area with approx 10 times the people compared to Fukushima. It’s only 8 meters above sea level and it’s also in risk of a tsunami in general. From my point of view that’s not an argument for the safety of nuclear power but more a “it didn’t happen this time”
It's argument for the safety of nuclear power, because 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami (Earthquake was the most powerful ever recorded in Japan, and the fourth most powerful recorded in the world since modern seismography began in 1900) caused over 15,000 deaths. In contrast the meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant started by the tsunami caused much less deaths.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_an...
Would a similar earthquake and tsunami cause 150 000 deaths, if it happen near Tōkai?
Nuclear operators studied the reasons for meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi NPP (failure to restore cooling after wide spread destruction of infrastructure around nuclear power plant and flooding of backup diesel generators underground) and have prepared steps to prevent it in other power plants (aditional backup diesel generators mounted in higher places, helicopter transport of spare cooling equipment when roads are destroyed).
"As an example, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) initiated an assessment of the country’s 56 nuclear power reactors as well as the 2 EPR reactors under construction. The ASN then prescribed the implementation of both fixed and mobile equipment that could potentially prevent a large release, including high-resistance diesel generators and pumps able to function in extreme scenarios such as major earthquakes or flooding. The availability of alternative sources of water for cooling was also prescribed under the same conditions. In addition, the ASN required a back-up plan including rapid action force groups that can be on site within 24 hours with light equipment and within three days with heavy equipment, using transportation means such as helicopters, and that can operate in a severely disrupted environment."
https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/ensuring-the-safety-of-nuclear...