Hijackings had happened many times. Including with weapons. There was plenty of knowledge that could have easily justified adding secure, lockable cockpit doors. And that would have been a good, low impact way of mitigating against known risks while also taking a whole host of unknown risks off the table or substantially reducing them, including reducing the chance of 9/11 having the impact it did or even being tried.
I think that is one of the changes that more focus on mitigating risk vs. avoiding it might have produced. E.g. when faced with heightened risk of terrorist attacks, a rational response would be to not focus so much on identifying potential attackers and stopping a specific plot, but spending more resources at looking into low impact ways to mitigate the consequences of at various broad modes of attack actually getting underway.
The specifics of 9/11 was probably near impossible to predict, but another eventual hijacking was a near certainty, and an eventual building collapse for whatever reason should have been considered a near certainty, as many high-rises have failed over the years too. The failure to reduce the potential impact of those known risks are the real failures of 9/11, not the failure to prevent the specific plot, as these were broad, known risks and the actual causes leading up to them would be largely irrelevant for a lot of mitigating actions.
Comments
Hijackings had happened many times. Including with weapons. There was plenty of knowledge that could have easily justified adding secure, lockable cockpit doors. And that would have been a good, low impact way of mitigating against known risks while also taking a whole host of unknown risks off the table or substantially reducing them, including reducing the chance of 9/11 having the impact it did or even being tried.
I think that is one of the changes that more focus on mitigating risk vs. avoiding it might have produced. E.g. when faced with heightened risk of terrorist attacks, a rational response would be to not focus so much on identifying potential attackers and stopping a specific plot, but spending more resources at looking into low impact ways to mitigate the consequences of at various broad modes of attack actually getting underway.
The specifics of 9/11 was probably near impossible to predict, but another eventual hijacking was a near certainty, and an eventual building collapse for whatever reason should have been considered a near certainty, as many high-rises have failed over the years too. The failure to reduce the potential impact of those known risks are the real failures of 9/11, not the failure to prevent the specific plot, as these were broad, known risks and the actual causes leading up to them would be largely irrelevant for a lot of mitigating actions.