This whole scheme fails if an attacker can manage to delay a transaction for a day, and if the commitment also commits to a particular transaction fee, then the user trying to rescue their funds can’t easily offer a larger transaction fee if their transaction is delayed. But if the commitment does not commit to a transaction fee, then an attacker could force the transaction fee to increase arbitrarily.
Maybe the right strategy would be commit, separately, to multiple different choices of transaction fee.
Comments
Commitment validation would indeed be trivial.
This whole scheme fails if an attacker can manage to delay a transaction for a day, and if the commitment also commits to a particular transaction fee, then the user trying to rescue their funds can’t easily offer a larger transaction fee if their transaction is delayed. But if the commitment does not commit to a transaction fee, then an attacker could force the transaction fee to increase arbitrarily.
Maybe the right strategy would be commit, separately, to multiple different choices of transaction fee.