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Comment on PassSeeds – hijacking Passkeys to unlock new cryptographic use casesparent

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What stops anyone else doing the ECDSA public key recovery hack by signing two identical messages and getting the public key, i.e. the thing you are using as a cryptographic seed?

In general, using a key for a purpose it was not designed for gets you into trouble. Treating a public key as private key seed material is almost certainly going to be a problem. Systems are just not designed to keep public keys secret, even if webauth does.

That would either mean you have arbitrary, malicious code executing in the bound origin (the origin was hacked and shipped malicious code), or you allowed random callers externally to take signatures out of the boundary - don't do either of these things, they are verboten. The whole point is that for the passkey you use as a PassSeed, you never do any signing other than locally for ECDSA recovery.

It seems malicious code on the phone can get the public key and thus derive the secret keys. This is weaker protection than PassKeys provide (would have to crack the hardware, not just software).

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