Great question! One of the core results of this paper was to explain this discrepancy. Basically, we found a 'mixture of theories' - a hybrid of prospect theory and expected utility theory, where people essentially arbitrate between one of the two decision-making mechanisms depending on the complexity of the gamble.
Curious that you can "mix" PT & EU functionals (with perceptron) but not the corresponding "decision-making mechanisms"..?
Great push. We actually can't make any mechanistic claims from the data/math in this paper. From an ML prediction standpoint, we're mixing a PT and EU theory together. But to what extent that is the actual cognitive process we have to remain agnostic about. That being said, a reason this arbitration between EU and PT is intriguing is because there's a lot of work about arbitration between dual process models in psychology (System 1 and 2; model-free and model-based; labor versus leisure; etc.)
Comments
Great question! One of the core results of this paper was to explain this discrepancy. Basically, we found a 'mixture of theories' - a hybrid of prospect theory and expected utility theory, where people essentially arbitrate between one of the two decision-making mechanisms depending on the complexity of the gamble.
Curious that you can "mix" PT & EU functionals (with perceptron) but not the corresponding "decision-making mechanisms"..?
(I might have missed an explicit description of these "decision-making mechanisms" in the paper)
Another curious statenent
Great push. We actually can't make any mechanistic claims from the data/math in this paper. From an ML prediction standpoint, we're mixing a PT and EU theory together. But to what extent that is the actual cognitive process we have to remain agnostic about. That being said, a reason this arbitration between EU and PT is intriguing is because there's a lot of work about arbitration between dual process models in psychology (System 1 and 2; model-free and model-based; labor versus leisure; etc.)