Each new _unrelated_ SHA1 attack will need an update in SHA1DC. But it has to be truly unrelated, as the collision detection method is fairly robust. I recommend reading the original "Counter-cryptanalysis" paper [0] for details on how attacks work and how they can be mitigated (there is certain internal state in SHA1 that is used in all known attacks). BTW, this paper has an interesting anecdote: apparently Flame malware had exploited MD5 collisions using novel unpublished attack method... and yet it was detected by collision detector (section 3.2). Another example is that SHA-mbles attack, published 3 years after "Counter-cryptanalysis", was detected as well, with no required code changes.
No, there is nothing "fundamentally incompatible" in the new SHA1DC method. After all, git came out in 2005, 11 years before SHA1 attacks were known, so it used regular SHA1. The collision detector was added in 2017 and nothing broke, because false positive chance is 2^-90 [1].
I have not heard of any new SHA1 collision results, but if they are based on no-difference differential paths, git has nothing to worry about. And if they are not, it may be possible to extend DC detector to seamlessly detect and prevent those attacks, and then only upgrade git clients, keeping backward and forward compatibility for data.
Of course there is always a chance that someone will come out with all-new SHA1 preimage attack that cannot be detected without high rate of false positive, so it's prudent to switch git to sha256. There is a lot of work being done: git's sha256 mode went out of beta in 2.42 (2023), but neither github nor gitlab support it.
But since the current state of git's sha is that there is nothing broken, and git git commit hash _is_ "enough to know you are distributing/executing the legitimate code, as opposed to a malicious doppelganger", there is no real pressure.
Comments
Each new _unrelated_ SHA1 attack will need an update in SHA1DC. But it has to be truly unrelated, as the collision detection method is fairly robust. I recommend reading the original "Counter-cryptanalysis" paper [0] for details on how attacks work and how they can be mitigated (there is certain internal state in SHA1 that is used in all known attacks). BTW, this paper has an interesting anecdote: apparently Flame malware had exploited MD5 collisions using novel unpublished attack method... and yet it was detected by collision detector (section 3.2). Another example is that SHA-mbles attack, published 3 years after "Counter-cryptanalysis", was detected as well, with no required code changes.
No, there is nothing "fundamentally incompatible" in the new SHA1DC method. After all, git came out in 2005, 11 years before SHA1 attacks were known, so it used regular SHA1. The collision detector was added in 2017 and nothing broke, because false positive chance is 2^-90 [1].
I have not heard of any new SHA1 collision results, but if they are based on no-difference differential paths, git has nothing to worry about. And if they are not, it may be possible to extend DC detector to seamlessly detect and prevent those attacks, and then only upgrade git clients, keeping backward and forward compatibility for data.
Of course there is always a chance that someone will come out with all-new SHA1 preimage attack that cannot be detected without high rate of false positive, so it's prudent to switch git to sha256. There is a lot of work being done: git's sha256 mode went out of beta in 2.42 (2023), but neither github nor gitlab support it.
But since the current state of git's sha is that there is nothing broken, and git git commit hash _is_ "enough to know you are distributing/executing the legitimate code, as opposed to a malicious doppelganger", there is no real pressure.
[0] https://marc-stevens.nl/research/papers/C13-S.pdf
[1] https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection