MCAS didn't cause the whole fleet to be grounded for months on end due to a simple documentation error. There were several instances of misconduct by Boeing, including misleading pilots about how the aircraf works, pressuring internal staff to certify procedures without enough time to validate them, offering configuration with only one angle of attack sensor. Worst of all, the whole MAX program was only intended to sidestep pilot and aircraft certification requirements by pretending that this brand new aircraft is just a small iteration in a 40 year old model.
Well, the resolution of the MCAS disaster was... pretty much a documentation update?
There is now a warning sticker on the 737-MAX that says "CAUTION: this aircraft is equipped with a stick pusher. See owners manual (updated versions only) for details. MAY CAUSE DEATH OR OTHER SIDE EFFECTS."
Oh, and possibly the stick pusher has been made less aggressive in situations that only occur outside North America. But the public record is, eh, sketchy on that. Best-case, pilots now at least know about it.
The number or the configuration of the air flow/angle-of-attack sensors on the 737-MAX was not changed, nor were there any changes to how these sensors are connected to the flight control systems. And probably rightfully so: the 737 platform is simply not about fly-by-wire, and retrofitting is not a realistic option. Whether the MCAS update(s) fit within those constraints remains to be seen, but has no bearing on the current discussion.
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MCAS didn't cause the whole fleet to be grounded for months on end due to a simple documentation error. There were several instances of misconduct by Boeing, including misleading pilots about how the aircraf works, pressuring internal staff to certify procedures without enough time to validate them, offering configuration with only one angle of attack sensor. Worst of all, the whole MAX program was only intended to sidestep pilot and aircraft certification requirements by pretending that this brand new aircraft is just a small iteration in a 40 year old model.
It's wild that no one went to jail for this.
Was there ever an answer about why the one AoA sensor failed, on each of those planes? Even though there was only one per plane, it was basically new.
Well, the resolution of the MCAS disaster was... pretty much a documentation update?
There is now a warning sticker on the 737-MAX that says "CAUTION: this aircraft is equipped with a stick pusher. See owners manual (updated versions only) for details. MAY CAUSE DEATH OR OTHER SIDE EFFECTS."
Oh, and possibly the stick pusher has been made less aggressive in situations that only occur outside North America. But the public record is, eh, sketchy on that. Best-case, pilots now at least know about it.
The number or the configuration of the air flow/angle-of-attack sensors on the 737-MAX was not changed, nor were there any changes to how these sensors are connected to the flight control systems. And probably rightfully so: the 737 platform is simply not about fly-by-wire, and retrofitting is not a realistic option. Whether the MCAS update(s) fit within those constraints remains to be seen, but has no bearing on the current discussion.