Looking at the causes of action, the tortious interference claim is going down in smoke, because one of the elements is that the breach of contract needs to have harmed Twitter, and Twitter hasn't alleged any harm. Which is surprising, because you could pretty much just write a sentence that basically says that scraping causes extra load or extra instability or whatnot and that would satisfy Twiqbal, but there's not even that.
As for the other claims, it seems to boil down to "scraping is against our ToS, and therefore they breached their contract." I'm not savvy enough on the case law to know how strong of a claim this is, but on a first inspection, I've noticed something curious. Twitter talks about a couple of ways that scraping would breach their ToS and then when talking about Bright Data, they don't quite allege that Bright Data did any of those, just that it engaged in scraping.
(It also feels to me like someone started drafting up a claim on violating the CFAA, until another lawyer tapped them on the shoulder and informed them that 9th Circuit precedent from last year is that scraping is absolutely not a CFAA violation.)
Looking at the causes of action, the tortious interference claim is going down in smoke, because one of the elements is that the breach of contract needs to have harmed Twitter, and Twitter hasn’t alleged any harm.
Yes, they have (paragraph 77). I suppose you could argue that it is not pled with sufficient specificity, but it looks like they’ve probably pled sufficient details to support it without actually being very explicit in drawing the connection (e.g., providing a mechanism for evading rate limits denies Twitter revenue that otherwise would be received by people seeking the data paying through tiered API access that Twitter sells, referenced in paragraph 27.) This seems like the kind of thing that, if it is a problem, will likely just be addressed by an amended complaint.
As for the other claims, it seems to boil down to “scraping is against our ToS, and therefore they breached their contract.” I’m not savvy enough on the case law to know how strong of a claim this is, but on a first inspection, I’ve noticed something curious. Twitter talks about a couple of ways that scraping would breach their ToS and then when talking about Bright Data, they don’t quite allege that Bright Data did any of those, just that it engaged in scraping.
They identify in general terms the nature of the breach in the breach cause of action (paragraph 64 lists five specific categories of actions in violation of the ToS), each of which is supported more specifically in the general narrative in paragraphs 1-57 that are realleged in each cause of action.
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If interested, this piece offers context with the docket and complaint documents: https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/elon...
Looking at the causes of action, the tortious interference claim is going down in smoke, because one of the elements is that the breach of contract needs to have harmed Twitter, and Twitter hasn't alleged any harm. Which is surprising, because you could pretty much just write a sentence that basically says that scraping causes extra load or extra instability or whatnot and that would satisfy Twiqbal, but there's not even that.
As for the other claims, it seems to boil down to "scraping is against our ToS, and therefore they breached their contract." I'm not savvy enough on the case law to know how strong of a claim this is, but on a first inspection, I've noticed something curious. Twitter talks about a couple of ways that scraping would breach their ToS and then when talking about Bright Data, they don't quite allege that Bright Data did any of those, just that it engaged in scraping.
(It also feels to me like someone started drafting up a claim on violating the CFAA, until another lawyer tapped them on the shoulder and informed them that 9th Circuit precedent from last year is that scraping is absolutely not a CFAA violation.)
Yes, they have (paragraph 77). I suppose you could argue that it is not pled with sufficient specificity, but it looks like they’ve probably pled sufficient details to support it without actually being very explicit in drawing the connection (e.g., providing a mechanism for evading rate limits denies Twitter revenue that otherwise would be received by people seeking the data paying through tiered API access that Twitter sells, referenced in paragraph 27.) This seems like the kind of thing that, if it is a problem, will likely just be addressed by an amended complaint.
They identify in general terms the nature of the breach in the breach cause of action (paragraph 64 lists five specific categories of actions in violation of the ToS), each of which is supported more specifically in the general narrative in paragraphs 1-57 that are realleged in each cause of action.
IF interested and you don’t pay for Bloomberg Law, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67637345/x-corp-v-brigh...