It seems more and more like the concept of an 'internal network' needs to die. Open everything up to the Internet at large, and harden it all accordingly. It makes sense from a user experience perspective (why shouldn't I be able to access my work from home or on the road), and with the increasing number of easily concealable connected devices it makes sense from a security perspective too.
That is an extremely naïve perspective. Imagine you run IT for 10,000 PCs across the US. For one, maybe 10% of these would need to be upgraded to get to an OS with modern security. Then there's the servers for internal applications which can't be upgraded without breaking things. And then you'll need to deal with all the support, explaining to employees why, yes, although they have tasks which need to run overnight, no, they can't disable automatic update, because it would put the corporation at risk. Not to mention the amount of work it takes to keep computers up to date even when the user isn't a problem.
And even with all of that, one day one of the computers gets a backdoor installed, and the attacker is able to copy everything off your network drive, because you didn't have any sort of IDS or firewall to prevent it.
Smarter people than you have thought about this. There's a reason the idea of an internal network exists at all; NAT certainly wasn't something people were considering right from the start.
There are 7 billion people alive today. It's silly to assume otherwise.
What's more is that it prevents learning. I was talking with friend of mine the other day about an idea to set up a sqlite database with a html/css/javascript front end in order to organize all the word documents and spreadsheets that currently are haphazardly tossed onto a shared drive at work.
He pointed out that that's basically a content management system, and I realized that up until that point I assumed I was the first person to ever think about this problem. Now I have a bunch of people's code to read and learn from.
It may be true but it's also rude, just like calling a fat person "fat" is probably truthful but rude and not very helpful to say in most conversations. tylermenezes used the phrase as an appeal to authority in order to demean the notatoad's argument. I don't think your example compares to that case (shutting down trains of thought vs. re-inventing wheels).
I disagree that it is naive. At the recently finished RSA conference it was a common theme in many of the discussions. Basically operations is going to 'lose the war' of trying to control every device that is inside your network because there are phones, and tablets, and personal computers etc. which all want to be 'connected' at some level. So creating an infrastructure that is tolerant of that may ultimately become the norm.
Apparently in some sensitive facilities there are networks keyed off by MAC address, and then 802.1x key, so you need to have both the right MAC and the right key for that MAC to get an address and to send and receive packets. Connecting to the network switch with a 'non-authorized' MAC puts you on a different VPN than the if you connect with an authorized machine.
One of the attendees at the show told me they assumed that their network was 'unsafe' all the time and planned accordingly.
Now its probably naive to think we would go there in a year or two but it does seem to be a road we're being inexorably forced down.
How does an intranet/VPN help with avoiding malware on end user computers? I don't see the connection, isn't that entirely orthogonal? The OP wasn't arguing that you shouldn't control end user's devices, just that having an intranet of some sorts is not helpful.
If you run a large network, you'll have to deal with malware on users devices, and you'll have to deal with people gaining access to your network in other ways, such as this white box.
Having an "internal" network that isn't actually internal only gives you a false sense of security. Having access to an internal network should never give anyone higher access levels, but the whole idea of a "corporate intranet" pushes you in that direction.
There are two new paradigms gaining momentum in enterprise environments:
- Assumption of breach
- Bring your own device
Assumption of breach is driven by the industry's over-emphasis on protection, versus detection and response. The harsh reality is an attacker will always be successful gaining access. The detection and response capabilities are historically anemic due to repeated under-investment. That's why you see so many intrusions reported and the attackers have been in place for months or years.
One of the natural results of assuming breach is to shift focus from protecting _devices_ to protecting _data_. An attacker can always land on the secretary's machine, but you can put additional layers of protection around the organization's critical data.
Bring your own device (BYOD) is a natural extension of assuming breach and shifting focus from data to devices, and aligns nicely with the user desires to use their iPads and smartphones. The result in these environments is the IT shop becomes more ISP and less Dell technical support.
Many industries are adopting the assumption of breach and inevitability of compromise. RSA Exec Chairman at the RSA Conf a couple weeks ago: "We need to acknowledge once and for all that our networks will be penetrated." BYOD is harder - popular for universities and hospitals with significant user mobility, less so for governments and financials with higher protection thresholds and more static environments.
In another five years, these ideas will be common practice for many industries. If you HN'ers have some crafty plans in the enterprise space, take note.
It seems more and more like the concept of 'local law enforcement' needs to die. Open everything up to everyone at large, and harden all men, women and children to the realities of violence.
We should disbanded corporate, local, state, federal and country law enforcement. there should be no countries, borders or walls anywhere and you should also leave your house/apartment/car door unlocked because we have all been hard ended by carrying loaded assult weapons and heavy armor 100% of the time, including your 5yo school kid.
Comments
It seems more and more like the concept of an 'internal network' needs to die. Open everything up to the Internet at large, and harden it all accordingly. It makes sense from a user experience perspective (why shouldn't I be able to access my work from home or on the road), and with the increasing number of easily concealable connected devices it makes sense from a security perspective too.
That is an extremely naïve perspective. Imagine you run IT for 10,000 PCs across the US. For one, maybe 10% of these would need to be upgraded to get to an OS with modern security. Then there's the servers for internal applications which can't be upgraded without breaking things. And then you'll need to deal with all the support, explaining to employees why, yes, although they have tasks which need to run overnight, no, they can't disable automatic update, because it would put the corporation at risk. Not to mention the amount of work it takes to keep computers up to date even when the user isn't a problem.
And even with all of that, one day one of the computers gets a backdoor installed, and the attacker is able to copy everything off your network drive, because you didn't have any sort of IDS or firewall to prevent it.
Smarter people than you have thought about this. There's a reason the idea of an internal network exists at all; NAT certainly wasn't something people were considering right from the start.
>Smarter people than you have thought about this.
That is very rude.
There are 7 billion people alive today. It's silly to assume otherwise.
What's more is that it prevents learning. I was talking with friend of mine the other day about an idea to set up a sqlite database with a html/css/javascript front end in order to organize all the word documents and spreadsheets that currently are haphazardly tossed onto a shared drive at work.
He pointed out that that's basically a content management system, and I realized that up until that point I assumed I was the first person to ever think about this problem. Now I have a bunch of people's code to read and learn from.
It may be true but it's also rude, just like calling a fat person "fat" is probably truthful but rude and not very helpful to say in most conversations. tylermenezes used the phrase as an appeal to authority in order to demean the notatoad's argument. I don't think your example compares to that case (shutting down trains of thought vs. re-inventing wheels).
I disagree that it is naive. At the recently finished RSA conference it was a common theme in many of the discussions. Basically operations is going to 'lose the war' of trying to control every device that is inside your network because there are phones, and tablets, and personal computers etc. which all want to be 'connected' at some level. So creating an infrastructure that is tolerant of that may ultimately become the norm.
Apparently in some sensitive facilities there are networks keyed off by MAC address, and then 802.1x key, so you need to have both the right MAC and the right key for that MAC to get an address and to send and receive packets. Connecting to the network switch with a 'non-authorized' MAC puts you on a different VPN than the if you connect with an authorized machine.
One of the attendees at the show told me they assumed that their network was 'unsafe' all the time and planned accordingly.
Now its probably naive to think we would go there in a year or two but it does seem to be a road we're being inexorably forced down.
How does an intranet/VPN help with avoiding malware on end user computers? I don't see the connection, isn't that entirely orthogonal? The OP wasn't arguing that you shouldn't control end user's devices, just that having an intranet of some sorts is not helpful.
If you run a large network, you'll have to deal with malware on users devices, and you'll have to deal with people gaining access to your network in other ways, such as this white box.
Having an "internal" network that isn't actually internal only gives you a false sense of security. Having access to an internal network should never give anyone higher access levels, but the whole idea of a "corporate intranet" pushes you in that direction.
Is it acceptable to run a VPN over the internet?
That's the whole point of a VPN: A Virtual, Private Network which runs on a Physical, Public Network, i.e., the Internet.
There are two new paradigms gaining momentum in enterprise environments:
Assumption of breach is driven by the industry's over-emphasis on protection, versus detection and response. The harsh reality is an attacker will always be successful gaining access. The detection and response capabilities are historically anemic due to repeated under-investment. That's why you see so many intrusions reported and the attackers have been in place for months or years.One of the natural results of assuming breach is to shift focus from protecting _devices_ to protecting _data_. An attacker can always land on the secretary's machine, but you can put additional layers of protection around the organization's critical data.
Bring your own device (BYOD) is a natural extension of assuming breach and shifting focus from data to devices, and aligns nicely with the user desires to use their iPads and smartphones. The result in these environments is the IT shop becomes more ISP and less Dell technical support.
Many industries are adopting the assumption of breach and inevitability of compromise. RSA Exec Chairman at the RSA Conf a couple weeks ago: "We need to acknowledge once and for all that our networks will be penetrated." BYOD is harder - popular for universities and hospitals with significant user mobility, less so for governments and financials with higher protection thresholds and more static environments.
In another five years, these ideas will be common practice for many industries. If you HN'ers have some crafty plans in the enterprise space, take note.
It seems more and more like the concept of 'local law enforcement' needs to die. Open everything up to everyone at large, and harden all men, women and children to the realities of violence.
We should disbanded corporate, local, state, federal and country law enforcement. there should be no countries, borders or walls anywhere and you should also leave your house/apartment/car door unlocked because we have all been hard ended by carrying loaded assult weapons and heavy armor 100% of the time, including your 5yo school kid.
oh.. will get karma from hell for this.
If you have sensitive data that you'd rather other people not see, the Internet is the last place you put it.
Even if the box has been "hardened"