Not really. That's the famous difference between Boeing and Airbus autopilots. In Boeing planes the pilot is in command and can override the autopilot by applying sufficient force against the autopilot's suggestions. You can still override the Airbus autopilot, but it is a detailed procedure designed to make the pilot reconsider whether that's the right thing to do. And it's unclear which is the right perspective.
First, that’s my bad on quoted text selection, in context it is clear that the system under discussion is not an autopilot but rather the entirety of the ATC system. But since that wasn’t obvious, I will attempt to respond in your context!
In that scenario, a time-sensitive decision will automatically lead to failure in cases where the autopilot is wrong. That’s a trade off I wouldn’t take but they chose it because in the same time-sensitive scenarios pilots are most prone to misunderstanding the situation and making a bad decision on that basis. However, in safety we do not ever blame the pilot for their misunderstanding and bad decision. Instead we look at the systematic forces that left them confused and attempt to improve the system.
If this is all conceptually new, I can highly recommend Dekker, The Field guide to Human Error which is about exactly this though the field has progressed since it was published in 2002.
Comments
Not really. That's the famous difference between Boeing and Airbus autopilots. In Boeing planes the pilot is in command and can override the autopilot by applying sufficient force against the autopilot's suggestions. You can still override the Airbus autopilot, but it is a detailed procedure designed to make the pilot reconsider whether that's the right thing to do. And it's unclear which is the right perspective.
First, that’s my bad on quoted text selection, in context it is clear that the system under discussion is not an autopilot but rather the entirety of the ATC system. But since that wasn’t obvious, I will attempt to respond in your context!
In that scenario, a time-sensitive decision will automatically lead to failure in cases where the autopilot is wrong. That’s a trade off I wouldn’t take but they chose it because in the same time-sensitive scenarios pilots are most prone to misunderstanding the situation and making a bad decision on that basis. However, in safety we do not ever blame the pilot for their misunderstanding and bad decision. Instead we look at the systematic forces that left them confused and attempt to improve the system.
If this is all conceptually new, I can highly recommend Dekker, The Field guide to Human Error which is about exactly this though the field has progressed since it was published in 2002.