I'll try that reasoning with my PCI/DSS auditors next time. Let's see what they think about that.
If you think I'm being hyperbolic, I'm not. Our org has recently gone through a PCI/DSS audit, and there was a lot of frustration about the amount of required changes with regards to locking down access policies, tracking suspicious activity, enforcing 2FA and such, but most of the stuff that I saw change was stuff that feels like it really should be entirely obligatory in the first place.
There is a great tradition in IT to teach yourselves using free (as well as free-of-charge) software, but when you're in the business of IT, there should be much stricter regulation. If you're a civil engineer and the bridge you design collapses because you did your math wrong, you are criminally liable for the damage. But if you're a software "architect" and you negligently put an instance of database-du-jour on the internet without proper access controls or a vulnerability tracking process, you most often get away by just saying "whoopsie-daisy" and giving a flimsy apology to the millions of customers that had their personal data stolen. Worst case scenario, you get a fee of a few percent of your earnings. That has to end.
Comments
this is somewhat a pipedream
orgs should support what people do
I'll try that reasoning with my PCI/DSS auditors next time. Let's see what they think about that.
If you think I'm being hyperbolic, I'm not. Our org has recently gone through a PCI/DSS audit, and there was a lot of frustration about the amount of required changes with regards to locking down access policies, tracking suspicious activity, enforcing 2FA and such, but most of the stuff that I saw change was stuff that feels like it really should be entirely obligatory in the first place.
There is a great tradition in IT to teach yourselves using free (as well as free-of-charge) software, but when you're in the business of IT, there should be much stricter regulation. If you're a civil engineer and the bridge you design collapses because you did your math wrong, you are criminally liable for the damage. But if you're a software "architect" and you negligently put an instance of database-du-jour on the internet without proper access controls or a vulnerability tracking process, you most often get away by just saying "whoopsie-daisy" and giving a flimsy apology to the millions of customers that had their personal data stolen. Worst case scenario, you get a fee of a few percent of your earnings. That has to end.
im not certain why any of that is at odds with providing secure secret management to employees
it's already a part of secret management for machines in secure cloud environments