Skip to content

Comment on On cryptography and dogmasparent

Comments

I see what you mean. That will no doubt work for the time being, but it does make me wonder how "future proof" that method is. Calculating hashes for any number of character combinations is trivially parallelizable. Even today, price aside, it wouldn't take much effort to spin up a large number of machines on AWS or a similar service to increase the speed in which new hashes could be added to a rainbow table. Eventually the size of the rainbow table will increase to the point where it would also contain the long salt + hash.

There are only two possibilities to get more security: either don't use password based authentication or force your users to pick passwords of 16 chars or more (or smaller if you can force capitalized letters, non alphanum chars...).

In general the math is trivial:

    (alphabet_size ^ password_size) / hashes_per_second
gives you the amount of seconds needed to crack a password. You can set hashes_per_second to 1 billion for attacks that a private can do with little money. Maybe set it to 1000 billions per second if you want to protect yourself against bigger entities. But once you enlarge the alphabet_size and the password_size it is fast to reach a point where no brute force attack is feasible at all.

Do you mean generating a new rainbow table for each possible value of the salt?

AboutSource Built by g1lg1l

Hackerly is an independent reader for Hacker News, built on the public HN API. Not affiliated with Y Combinator.