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Comment on Congestion Control Arrives in Tor 0.4.7-stableparent

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There has been plenty of work on how to de-anonymize Tor users over the years, e.g., see https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrex/papers/usenixsec15.pdf.

But that's not what gp asked.

Has the work you linked to been shown to lead to the successful deanonymization of a normal user during normal Tor browsing? It's a simple yes or no question. I don't follow tor news like I used to but I'm willing to bet a months-worth of salary that the answer is still no.

Unless the NSA, FBI, or whoever comes out and says oh we broke Tor, I don't see how you could ever get a definite answer to that question. And I don't really see that happening.

Or it could leaked, on accident or by a whistleblower. But that's pretty uncommon.

True, but it'd be difficult to both make arrests based on info learned from having broken Tor, and keep it secret that they'd broken Tor. It's possible by obscuring how they got information (e.g. via parallel construction), but difficult to do at scale.

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