Just that it is possible to explain something with simpler language doesn't mean it is always desirable to. Somehow a standard of comprehensbility is leveled at philosophy that no other field is expected to meet. There are very few people complaining about the unreadability of quantum equations in fundamental physics or the jargon of theoretical mathematics. We appreciate why this is necessary for those fields, that there is a difference between science research and science communication. Yet for philosophy, especially that which criticises the current order, this is somehow seen as discrediting.
Just that it is possible to explain something with simpler language doesn't mean it is always desirable to.
Why? As a scientist doing theoretical work, one of my main drives isn't always to discover new things, it's to explain known things "better", where better usually means in terms of simpler concepts or with more lightweight objects, with less accidental complexity. This goal of simplicity is very central in science, with concepts like occam's razor.
There are very few people complaining about the unreadability of quantum equations in fundamental physics or the jargon of theoretical mathematics.
I can't speak for physics, but in mathematics a lot of people (mathematicians, logicians) criticize the mathematical jargon of category theory. And in fact there are lots of people in the programming language community (around type theory) that imho is trying to make category theory more accessible by using it parcimonously, rewording stuff and making it shine in simple ways (by giving some short hints for categorists but otherwise explaining classic lemma instead of referencing them).
Yet for philosophy, especially that which criticises the current order, this is somehow seen as discrediting.
There's critic and critic. Having a text full of unnecessary jargon does imho greatly reduces any subversive pretensions. Things will always have some intrinsic complexity, but adding additional complexity in the form of tons of implicit references (when the relevant part could have been explained succintly) or poetic writing style is an obstruction to the sharing of knowledge (which is the actual benchmark for subversivity: how much can it lead to actual actions).
But philosophy doesn't tend to layer so deep as to require especially complex jargon. You need to know some of the field-specific ideas (signifier/signified for semiotics for example) but these are intuitive concepts that relate to daily life, not hyper-specialised concepts like what you'd find in chemistry or physics.
Given how many people get upset by even the term "postmodernism", I think it's a worthy exercise to make the concepts more accessible so that less people think it's an exercise in trying to destroy the philosophical foundations of the West, and more an exercise in trying to understand the reality we live in.
Richard Feynman, the father of quantum physics, had a rule that, if you couldn’t explain it to a five-year-old, then you didn’t actually understand it.
The original papers that introduced quantum mechanics might well be unreadable and mired in jargon. However, the community has come together, digested these ideas, and written textbooks that are accessible to anyone with a minimum of preparation. Furthermore, what preparation one is expected to know (some linear algebra, some calculus, some classical mechanics) is clearly laid out, and has textbooks one can use to study.
No such path of learning is ever presented for any of postmodernism. The twin obsessions of (a) treating only primary sources as authoritative , coupled with (b) the dense jargon of the primary sources that makes it unreadable to anyone but the experts is what makes postmodern philosophy unapproachable.
This forces people to discredit much if postmodernism. It seems to be a community that refuses to expand and make approachable their work, while claiming that their work has important ramifications. That reeks of snake oil salesmanship to me.
A model is proposed for the evolution of the profile of a growing interface. The deterministic growth is solved exactly, and exhibits nontrivial relaxation patterns. The stochastic version is studied by dynamic renormalization-group techniques and by mappings to Burgers's equation and to a random directed-polymer problem. The exact dynamic scaling form obtained for a one-dimensional interface is in excellent agreement with previous numerical simulations. Predictions are made for more dimensions.
This is who they gave the nobel prize to last year. I don't know how anyone can take these people seriously when this is supposed to be the definitive text on the Kardar–Parisi–Zhang equation.
Comments
Just that it is possible to explain something with simpler language doesn't mean it is always desirable to. Somehow a standard of comprehensbility is leveled at philosophy that no other field is expected to meet. There are very few people complaining about the unreadability of quantum equations in fundamental physics or the jargon of theoretical mathematics. We appreciate why this is necessary for those fields, that there is a difference between science research and science communication. Yet for philosophy, especially that which criticises the current order, this is somehow seen as discrediting.
Why? As a scientist doing theoretical work, one of my main drives isn't always to discover new things, it's to explain known things "better", where better usually means in terms of simpler concepts or with more lightweight objects, with less accidental complexity. This goal of simplicity is very central in science, with concepts like occam's razor.
I can't speak for physics, but in mathematics a lot of people (mathematicians, logicians) criticize the mathematical jargon of category theory. And in fact there are lots of people in the programming language community (around type theory) that imho is trying to make category theory more accessible by using it parcimonously, rewording stuff and making it shine in simple ways (by giving some short hints for categorists but otherwise explaining classic lemma instead of referencing them).
There's critic and critic. Having a text full of unnecessary jargon does imho greatly reduces any subversive pretensions. Things will always have some intrinsic complexity, but adding additional complexity in the form of tons of implicit references (when the relevant part could have been explained succintly) or poetic writing style is an obstruction to the sharing of knowledge (which is the actual benchmark for subversivity: how much can it lead to actual actions).
But philosophy doesn't tend to layer so deep as to require especially complex jargon. You need to know some of the field-specific ideas (signifier/signified for semiotics for example) but these are intuitive concepts that relate to daily life, not hyper-specialised concepts like what you'd find in chemistry or physics.
Given how many people get upset by even the term "postmodernism", I think it's a worthy exercise to make the concepts more accessible so that less people think it's an exercise in trying to destroy the philosophical foundations of the West, and more an exercise in trying to understand the reality we live in.
Richard Feynman, the father of quantum physics, had a rule that, if you couldn’t explain it to a five-year-old, then you didn’t actually understand it.
Yet he did not address his scientific papers to five-year-olds.
Maybe they were addressed to a five-year-old Richard Feynman
The original papers that introduced quantum mechanics might well be unreadable and mired in jargon. However, the community has come together, digested these ideas, and written textbooks that are accessible to anyone with a minimum of preparation. Furthermore, what preparation one is expected to know (some linear algebra, some calculus, some classical mechanics) is clearly laid out, and has textbooks one can use to study.
No such path of learning is ever presented for any of postmodernism. The twin obsessions of (a) treating only primary sources as authoritative , coupled with (b) the dense jargon of the primary sources that makes it unreadable to anyone but the experts is what makes postmodern philosophy unapproachable.
This forces people to discredit much if postmodernism. It seems to be a community that refuses to expand and make approachable their work, while claiming that their work has important ramifications. That reeks of snake oil salesmanship to me.
This is who they gave the nobel prize to last year. I don't know how anyone can take these people seriously when this is supposed to be the definitive text on the Kardar–Parisi–Zhang equation.