Windows have been teaching users to install from third parties
? Installing directly from the source instead of from an intermediary is good, not bad. Walled garden and 1P-only app stores are worse than the problems they fix.
added auto-run features to removable media
Imagine computers just working. Who would want that.
Seriously, Microsoft has a lot to be criticized for, but none of the things in your comment make the list.
? Installing directly from the source instead of from an intermediary is good, not bad.
How many users did actually install directly from the source and not from a highly visible third party download page that collected and repackaged many programs with some drive by downloads involving adware? I remember falling for that a few times in my youth and even sites like Sourceforge hosting the projects directly ended up hijacking installers for a time.
Imagine computers just working. Who would want that.
The fix was to pop up a window and asking if you want it to run. Nothing broken about that. Auto running software on an OS where everyone is sys admin by default is not a good idea.
I don't see anything wrong with auto running a CD. I physically put it in the computer. And seriously, what security checks do you think a normal user is going to do between the pop-up appearing and clicking "run"?
Edit: three responses, zero examples of checks an actual user would do. Two references to the Sony rootkit, which was resolved after intense press by Sony removing the rootkit unconditionally, not by giving the users a choice, because everybody knows users would have clicked yes.
A mass storage device is supposed to contain data, and possibly software. When you connect a MSD, in general, you probably want to access the data inside it - its filesystem.
If an "autorun" system is implemented, and on by default, MSDs become a hefty vector for circulating malware - it takes little to foresee it. This happened - and out of a really bad idea: "connecting a device" is in general not to be interpreted as "wanting to run software".
About instead the «normal/actual user» (though I do not understand how it is relevant), well, if said user connected a MSD, a data container, and were prompted that some code "wanted" to be executed, the user is supposed to react in terms of "WTF?!". Exceptional classes of cases can be managed - but really, the advantage of avoiding opening the device filesystem and starting an executable is less than negligible. When such behaviour is desired, a system should be specialized for that whole framework (and should revolve around the design concept of "trusting software").
I would say bewilderment that a music/video/data CD wants to execute an auto start exe on it. Other than that you may want to check if the CD actually contains the program you expect before running it.
Then you have Sony which abused auto run to install a rootkit on PCs as part of its copy protection.
You want examples of auto-run abuse… I saw many usb keychains with autorun.ini and a lot of hidden files combined with links to other hidden files to simulate the “regular” files after spreading the malware if you click them.
It explores many vulnerabilities: auto-run, hidden extensions, no protection to running not signed binaries, links that are not simple filesystem links…
Windows evolved in a time when solutions for usability problems did not consider security. Now, in the name of compatibility, these vulnerabilities had to be maintained and users were trained to believe that was the right way to do things.
This gave windows users a reputation of being negligent, but most are not. They were trained like dogs to behave like that.
This is a huge security risk. Microsoft actually f
ixed it. The system shouldn't do anything that cou
ld compromise it without explicit user interventio
n.
Want the computer to do something, tell it to it.
Inserting a physical media doesn't means you want
adware automatically installed.
The sheer number of original sources and secondhand sources that each need to be individually vetted clearly requires a lot more work and skill than using a well-curated package manager.
And a lot of vendors that should have been trustworthy ended up taking advantage of it by sneaking unwanted software in with the good stuff. Off the top of my head, Adobe did this. There was a glorious time in the 90s and early oughts where seemingly everything was trying so install another toolbar into IE...
There aren't any well curated package managers for normal users.
Linux distributions like Debian barely make the cut for technical users, folks who are used to going to forums and finding alternative packages. Even so, Linux packaging is filled with drama, contradictory standards, alternate sources required for specialized applications, and occasionally downright bad decisions (like shipping insecure CAs). The only way to scale such a model to normal users is the way Apple and Google have done it on their mobile platforms, and frankly, those stores still have a fair amount of malware in them (Android especially - it's sandboxing that is actually useful here, not a package manager) and come with pretty massive anti-competitive downsides.
And some users liked the toolbars. Just like some users like Facebook. Toolbars aren't actually the problem - it's the way they slurp up your data - it's not a problem that needs a technical solution, more of a user education solution (just like Facebook).
I didn't say that package managers are perfect. I think they are a lot better. They have downsides related to centralized control and contradictory interests, but I believe the good outweighs the bad and you can usually install software from somewhere else if you really need to, with one conspicuous exception.
Most Linux distributions fit for desktop use ship with an "app store" presentation so I think accessibility has been addressed.
> Windows have been teaching users to install fro
m third parties
? Installing directly from the source instead of
from an intermediary is good, not bad. Walled gard
en and 1P-only app stores are worse than the probl
ems they fix.
Consider package managers. Debian repos are full o
f wonderful useful ad-free FLOSS.
> added auto-run features to removable media
Imagine computers just working. Who would want t
hat.
Answered on another reply.
Seriously, Microsoft has a lot to be criticized
for, but none of the things in your comment make t
he list.
People believing it is part of the reasons of wind
ows security flaws. As I said, you was carefully t
rained to believe it.
Please try not to be rude. I have decades of experience on Linux. I'm giving my good faith opinion. You won't get far in life by assuming those who disagree with you have been duped / trained into their disagreement.
See my other comment - Debian's packaging is just ok, not good, and it only manages to be sufficient because its users are highly technical and can work around breakage. It also is an ecosystem that is several orders of magnitude smaller and thus easier.
Comments
? Installing directly from the source instead of from an intermediary is good, not bad. Walled garden and 1P-only app stores are worse than the problems they fix.
Imagine computers just working. Who would want that.
Seriously, Microsoft has a lot to be criticized for, but none of the things in your comment make the list.
How many users did actually install directly from the source and not from a highly visible third party download page that collected and repackaged many programs with some drive by downloads involving adware? I remember falling for that a few times in my youth and even sites like Sourceforge hosting the projects directly ended up hijacking installers for a time.
The fix was to pop up a window and asking if you want it to run. Nothing broken about that. Auto running software on an OS where everyone is sys admin by default is not a good idea.
I don't see anything wrong with auto running a CD. I physically put it in the computer. And seriously, what security checks do you think a normal user is going to do between the pop-up appearing and clicking "run"?
Edit: three responses, zero examples of checks an actual user would do. Two references to the Sony rootkit, which was resolved after intense press by Sony removing the rootkit unconditionally, not by giving the users a choice, because everybody knows users would have clicked yes.
A mass storage device is supposed to contain data, and possibly software. When you connect a MSD, in general, you probably want to access the data inside it - its filesystem.
If an "autorun" system is implemented, and on by default, MSDs become a hefty vector for circulating malware - it takes little to foresee it. This happened - and out of a really bad idea: "connecting a device" is in general not to be interpreted as "wanting to run software".
About instead the «normal/actual user» (though I do not understand how it is relevant), well, if said user connected a MSD, a data container, and were prompted that some code "wanted" to be executed, the user is supposed to react in terms of "WTF?!". Exceptional classes of cases can be managed - but really, the advantage of avoiding opening the device filesystem and starting an executable is less than negligible. When such behaviour is desired, a system should be specialized for that whole framework (and should revolve around the design concept of "trusting software").
I would say bewilderment that a music/video/data CD wants to execute an auto start exe on it. Other than that you may want to check if the CD actually contains the program you expect before running it.
Then you have Sony which abused auto run to install a rootkit on PCs as part of its copy protection.
These users don't know the difference between an exe and a mp3, come on. They'd figure it was auto starting iTunes.
How do you expect a normal user to verify the contents of a CD?
Not if they are never given the choice.
You want examples of auto-run abuse… I saw many usb keychains with autorun.ini and a lot of hidden files combined with links to other hidden files to simulate the “regular” files after spreading the malware if you click them.
It explores many vulnerabilities: auto-run, hidden extensions, no protection to running not signed binaries, links that are not simple filesystem links…
Windows evolved in a time when solutions for usability problems did not consider security. Now, in the name of compatibility, these vulnerabilities had to be maintained and users were trained to believe that was the right way to do things.
This gave windows users a reputation of being negligent, but most are not. They were trained like dogs to behave like that.
This is a huge security risk. Microsoft actually f ixed it. The system shouldn't do anything that cou ld compromise it without explicit user interventio n.
Want the computer to do something, tell it to it. Inserting a physical media doesn't means you want adware automatically installed.
We had a big hullabaloo about this in 2005 when Sony put a rootkit on audio CDs.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_BMG_copy_protection_rootk...
The sheer number of original sources and secondhand sources that each need to be individually vetted clearly requires a lot more work and skill than using a well-curated package manager.
And a lot of vendors that should have been trustworthy ended up taking advantage of it by sneaking unwanted software in with the good stuff. Off the top of my head, Adobe did this. There was a glorious time in the 90s and early oughts where seemingly everything was trying so install another toolbar into IE...
There is plenty here to be critical of.
There aren't any well curated package managers for normal users.
Linux distributions like Debian barely make the cut for technical users, folks who are used to going to forums and finding alternative packages. Even so, Linux packaging is filled with drama, contradictory standards, alternate sources required for specialized applications, and occasionally downright bad decisions (like shipping insecure CAs). The only way to scale such a model to normal users is the way Apple and Google have done it on their mobile platforms, and frankly, those stores still have a fair amount of malware in them (Android especially - it's sandboxing that is actually useful here, not a package manager) and come with pretty massive anti-competitive downsides.
And some users liked the toolbars. Just like some users like Facebook. Toolbars aren't actually the problem - it's the way they slurp up your data - it's not a problem that needs a technical solution, more of a user education solution (just like Facebook).
I didn't say that package managers are perfect. I think they are a lot better. They have downsides related to centralized control and contradictory interests, but I believe the good outweighs the bad and you can usually install software from somewhere else if you really need to, with one conspicuous exception.
Most Linux distributions fit for desktop use ship with an "app store" presentation so I think accessibility has been addressed.
GNOME software and similar software are quite close to that.
Flatpak looks reasonably well curated for now.
Consider package managers. Debian repos are full o f wonderful useful ad-free FLOSS.
Answered on another reply.
People believing it is part of the reasons of wind ows security flaws. As I said, you was carefully t rained to believe it.
Please try not to be rude. I have decades of experience on Linux. I'm giving my good faith opinion. You won't get far in life by assuming those who disagree with you have been duped / trained into their disagreement.
See my other comment - Debian's packaging is just ok, not good, and it only manages to be sufficient because its users are highly technical and can work around breakage. It also is an ecosystem that is several orders of magnitude smaller and thus easier.
You're right. I crossed the line. That was disrespectful. Sorry for that. I'll try to better handle insistence the next time.