The defaults assume your appetite for security risk is much greater than your appetite for interop failure.
Imagine two products that could easily exist, almost the same features:
A by default works just fine, but there's a risk an adversary spends $10M to attack you. You can tweak the config and replace all the OmniCorp CheapDevices in your estate to get rid of that attack which is best practice.
B by default requires that you replace all the OmniCorp CheapDevices in your estate or it won't work. You can tweak the config and risk that an adversary spends $10M to attack you so that the OmniCorp CheapDevices still work.
Which one do you buy? You buy A of course. Nobody is going to sign off on the budget to replace all the OmniCorp CheapDevices. What's this nonsense about a $10M attack anyway?
At some point the risk is judged to be too high, and people flip the defaults for those risks. For example OpenSSH decided the risk for SHA1 authentication is now too high, like the Web PKI had years before, but despite SSH being a much less plausible target than the Web PKI for various reasons.
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The defaults assume your appetite for security risk is much greater than your appetite for interop failure.
Imagine two products that could easily exist, almost the same features:
A by default works just fine, but there's a risk an adversary spends $10M to attack you. You can tweak the config and replace all the OmniCorp CheapDevices in your estate to get rid of that attack which is best practice.
B by default requires that you replace all the OmniCorp CheapDevices in your estate or it won't work. You can tweak the config and risk that an adversary spends $10M to attack you so that the OmniCorp CheapDevices still work.
Which one do you buy? You buy A of course. Nobody is going to sign off on the budget to replace all the OmniCorp CheapDevices. What's this nonsense about a $10M attack anyway?
At some point the risk is judged to be too high, and people flip the defaults for those risks. For example OpenSSH decided the risk for SHA1 authentication is now too high, like the Web PKI had years before, but despite SSH being a much less plausible target than the Web PKI for various reasons.