Anyone could review extensions in Chrome's gallery and provide a seal of quality or recommended avoid list.
With Chrome's model, competing groups with different priorities could recommend different sets of apps to use or avoid, just like competing review magazines for consumer goods.
Mozilla's model invites pressure from DHS to kill specific apps the government doesn't like. So far Mozilla has rejected calls to kill extensions that help circumvent state sponsored blacklists,* but for how long?
As Google learned in China, if there is a technical measure which could hypothetically suppress speech, then some government will eventually demand its use.
Comments
Anyone could review extensions in Chrome's gallery and provide a seal of quality or recommended avoid list.
With Chrome's model, competing groups with different priorities could recommend different sets of apps to use or avoid, just like competing review magazines for consumer goods.
Mozilla's model invites pressure from DHS to kill specific apps the government doesn't like. So far Mozilla has rejected calls to kill extensions that help circumvent state sponsored blacklists,* but for how long?
As Google learned in China, if there is a technical measure which could hypothetically suppress speech, then some government will eventually demand its use.
* See "MAFIAAfire"