You can for example, at your network level point get.pow.cx to a malicious script and you're done. That's the security issue, it has nothing to do with the HTTP protocol.
With that being said, I don't care, the risk is the same as downloading any software via http, in fact I loved it, so easy :-).
In fact it's much more transparent. With a compiled binary you don't see the steps involved, with a bash script you can step line by line and see exactly what the script is doing.
Those that don't care won't look at the script any more than they'll check the md5 hash of a binary to see that it's a legit binary. For those that care, they can look at the bash source.
Sorry, I just don't agree with this, but I also recognize it as a topic that we can nerd out over for hours and hours without improving the universe even a little. If what 'tptacek thinks about the security of software distribution means anything to you --- I'm not saying it has to --- then know that I think this is a bad idea that is only not causing problems because it is a gimmick used by so few projects.
I'm really, really trying to understand your viewpoint on this. How is this any more insecure than downloading (over HTTP) and running a graphical installer that requires your root password? Is it just because it takes a bit more effort to exploit a binary, given a MitM position, or am I missing something else?
You mean DNS spoofing. That only works if you can get a valid certificate at one of the recognized CAs. If you use a self-signed one curl will still complain unless -k is given. But then again, after the Comodo fiasco...
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No you're not! It's the same security issue.
You can for example, at your network level point get.pow.cx to a malicious script and you're done. That's the security issue, it has nothing to do with the HTTP protocol.
With that being said, I don't care, the risk is the same as downloading any software via http, in fact I loved it, so easy :-).
In fact it's much more transparent. With a compiled binary you don't see the steps involved, with a bash script you can step line by line and see exactly what the script is doing.
Those that don't care won't look at the script any more than they'll check the md5 hash of a binary to see that it's a legit binary. For those that care, they can look at the bash source.
Sorry, I just don't agree with this, but I also recognize it as a topic that we can nerd out over for hours and hours without improving the universe even a little. If what 'tptacek thinks about the security of software distribution means anything to you --- I'm not saying it has to --- then know that I think this is a bad idea that is only not causing problems because it is a gimmick used by so few projects.
I'm really, really trying to understand your viewpoint on this. How is this any more insecure than downloading (over HTTP) and running a graphical installer that requires your root password? Is it just because it takes a bit more effort to exploit a binary, given a MitM position, or am I missing something else?
We get that you think it is a bad idea, but don't know/understand why/how?
Since you are the security expert at Hn, we are trying to understand/learn from you.
This is not plain Nerdgasm making people understand about software security is making the world a little better.
You mean DNS spoofing. That only works if you can get a valid certificate at one of the recognized CAs. If you use a self-signed one curl will still complain unless -k is given. But then again, after the Comodo fiasco...
Maybe not entirely true: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/03/18/revocation.html