The latter is effective even with the recommended Foreshadow mitigations
That's different than saying it's effective even with mitigations required for other Spectre-related exploits. When larger problems arise and more general mitigations applied that also happen to be better mitigations for previous, narrower exploits, people don't usually make much effort to review and revise old papers.
AFAIU, discovery of Meltdown slightly predates Spectre, or at least the point at which the implications began to blow up. The Meltdown and Spectre papers were published the same month Foreshadow was discovered and privately reported. It seems two researchers were involved with both Foreshadow and the earlier Spectre work, but that doesn't mean they would have or should have fully grasped the deeper relationships. And all of this happened over 2 1/2 years ago. Since then researchers' understanding of the underlying issues has improved greatly.
The tone of the paper is, I think, problematic. Just read footnote #1, which self-defensively says: "Various authors of papers exploiting the prefetching effect confirmed that the explanation put forward in this paper indeed explains the observed phenomena more accurately than their original explanations. We believe it is in the nature of empirical science that theories explaining empirical observations improve over time and root-cause attributions become more accurate."
So their presentation is "more accurate". And the writers of the 2+ year-old papers readily admit it. All of which is another way of saying these were already accepted, if not yet concretely expressed, beliefs in the research community. There's much value in putting pen to paper and running confirmatory experiments. But that doesn't make it groundbreaking.
EDIT: Regarding "We demonstrate that these dereferencing effects exist even on the most recent Intel CPUs with the latest hardware mitigations, and on CPUs previously believed to be unaffected, i.e., ARM, IBM, and AMD CPUs". If you read closely it's clear that the context is Foreshadow, mechanism and mitigations. They're saying that when Foreshadow was published those architectures were believed immune. But applying the principles of their "more accurate" understanding you can in fact achieve Foreshadow (or Foreshadow-like) side channels on those architectures even with Foreshadow-specific mitigations. But, again, only subsequent to the initial discovery of both Foreshadow and Spectre did it became known that those architectures were more susceptible to speculative execution attacks than originally understood. Thus elsewhere in the paper it's admitted that more general and modern Spectre mitigations also prevent these "new" Foreshadow exploits.
AFAIU, discovery of Meltdown slightly predates Spectre, or at least the point at which the implications began to blow up. The Meltdown and Spectre papers were published the same month Foreshadow was discovered and privately reported. It seems two researchers were involved with both Foreshadow and the earlier Spectre work, but that doesn't mean they would have or should have fully grasped the deeper relationships. And all of this happened over 2 1/2 years ago. Since then researchers' understanding of the underlying issues has improved greatly.
I'm under the impression that the side channels created by caches and speculative execution have been known publicly (but with limited reach/impact) as far back as the 90s. E.g. the 1991 paper "A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel" mentions data security problems and the creation of side channels when processor caches are used.
Comments
That's different than saying it's effective even with mitigations required for other Spectre-related exploits. When larger problems arise and more general mitigations applied that also happen to be better mitigations for previous, narrower exploits, people don't usually make much effort to review and revise old papers.
AFAIU, discovery of Meltdown slightly predates Spectre, or at least the point at which the implications began to blow up. The Meltdown and Spectre papers were published the same month Foreshadow was discovered and privately reported. It seems two researchers were involved with both Foreshadow and the earlier Spectre work, but that doesn't mean they would have or should have fully grasped the deeper relationships. And all of this happened over 2 1/2 years ago. Since then researchers' understanding of the underlying issues has improved greatly.
The tone of the paper is, I think, problematic. Just read footnote #1, which self-defensively says: "Various authors of papers exploiting the prefetching effect confirmed that the explanation put forward in this paper indeed explains the observed phenomena more accurately than their original explanations. We believe it is in the nature of empirical science that theories explaining empirical observations improve over time and root-cause attributions become more accurate."
So their presentation is "more accurate". And the writers of the 2+ year-old papers readily admit it. All of which is another way of saying these were already accepted, if not yet concretely expressed, beliefs in the research community. There's much value in putting pen to paper and running confirmatory experiments. But that doesn't make it groundbreaking.
EDIT: Regarding "We demonstrate that these dereferencing effects exist even on the most recent Intel CPUs with the latest hardware mitigations, and on CPUs previously believed to be unaffected, i.e., ARM, IBM, and AMD CPUs". If you read closely it's clear that the context is Foreshadow, mechanism and mitigations. They're saying that when Foreshadow was published those architectures were believed immune. But applying the principles of their "more accurate" understanding you can in fact achieve Foreshadow (or Foreshadow-like) side channels on those architectures even with Foreshadow-specific mitigations. But, again, only subsequent to the initial discovery of both Foreshadow and Spectre did it became known that those architectures were more susceptible to speculative execution attacks than originally understood. Thus elsewhere in the paper it's admitted that more general and modern Spectre mitigations also prevent these "new" Foreshadow exploits.
I'm under the impression that the side channels created by caches and speculative execution have been known publicly (but with limited reach/impact) as far back as the 90s. E.g. the 1991 paper "A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel" mentions data security problems and the creation of side channels when processor caches are used.