Today, most independent researchers believe that the 1979 [Vela Incident] flash was caused by a nuclear explosion — perhaps an undeclared nuclear test carried out by South Africa and Israel.
Yeah, I think this is the best clue of how the sputh africans tested their nukes.
A weird nuclear policy that one: build and test in secrecy, never tell anyone you have them unless things are really dire, and only then do a public reveal. Explain that one with deterrance theory
That sounds a bit like Israel’s policy — Although officially Israel’s policy is one of deliberate ambiguity, if they have nukes then they are doing exactly what you just said; and if they don’t, then presumably the scientist that they imprisoned for revealing the existence of the nuclear program was a stooge designed to make them look scary without any of the cost and complexity of actually bothering to make any nukes of their own.
While he did revealed some information a lot of the technical details he talked about during his early interviews made absolutely no sense.
He was imprisoned on the basis of revealing classified information and taking photographs of a sensitive site.
Whether Israel has actual assembled weapons or not, they are a breakout state they have 2 reactors one at Dimona one at Soreq and even if in the 60’s and 70’s they didn’t had the knowledge to build nukes considering they took in nearly 2M Russian Jews and their family members they probably could’ve gained that capability from that immigration since the late 80’s to early 90’s.
Israel can also potentially posses a nuclear Triad however for Israel nukes are only really useful as a deterrent against a conventional threat as due to their size MAD will not work for them against any of their possible opponents in the region.
MAD also requires that everyone in the equation will be sane and held accountable, if there is an Islamist coup in say Pakistan or if a regional theocratic regime gets nukes it’s not clear how MAD would work even if the geographical and population sizes weren’t that different.
MAD still applies to Israel if they can field a sufficient submarine force to retaliate against a first-strike, unless their opposition can also field enough hunter-killer submarines to perform a full decapitation with surety.
Also worth pointing out, while a theocratic takeover of a state like Pakistan would be infinitely problematic, (probably) particularly for non-proliferation, MAD still applies unless the takeover is a flat-out doomsday cult. Problematic as I may find an Islamist theocracy as a Westerner, they're not insane, but simply of very different cultural belief. Should anyone want to live to see tomorrow, and or allow their offspring to do so then MAD applies.
I'm certain they have the nukes, since South Africa did for a fact. They became the first nuclear power to invite the UN to disassemble all their nuclear weapons. Before the apartheid government handed over power to the Mandela government.
Not so weierd... Develop in secret. Once you have it your enemies knows in any case. And if you can maintain plausible deniability it is much easier to keep developing / much less public scrutiny, especially if you already are operating a highly unpopular apartheid state.
I remember that during the war with Cuba in Angola the South Africans deployed their nuke on the border, the Cubans knew this and as such the South African border was never threatend.
I feel like any level of confusion is potentially a greater risk for all involved. We already have seen situations where there is enough doubt about circumstances that people get close to a catastrophic decision when people do know.
It's just the Art of War. If you don't have a strong program yet, say nothing about it and let your enemies wonder about your capabilities. Just because they may have one undeclared test doesn't necessarily mean they could succeed with a public MAD strategy; they may need many more nukes than they currently have.
If they say they have none, their enemies might think there's a chance they actually have a lot, or at least enough to cause serious damage. And there's the deterrence. If they say they have a lot but don't demonstrate it, their enemies will probably think they're bluffing and will demand proof. I think it only makes sense to go public when it's a gun that can be pointed directly at someone's head, rather than a few of their toes. It's probably the best way to project a strong posture despite not actually having one.
And more practically, it lets them develop the program with less chance of other countries (including allies) complaining about it or condemning it, which could potentially slow it down or stop it before it's sufficiently developed.
They were intended to defend against conventional attacks by their neighbors, not deter other nuclear powers. It would still be nice to deter such attacks, but it also works to reveal them after the attack begins, or just use them. I imagine they didn’t think it was worth provoking condemnation from the international community by revealing them.
Basic of military tactics, don't let enemy know what have hit them. Or better to rephrase, don't let your enemy to know what you will hit them with, moreover if the weapon you will hit them is that big.
Imagine US actions if in 2003, mushroom clouds would've actually risen over major US cities, out of a sudden. If you remember, Saddam did a last minute bluff, promising "fiery death" to NYC, and Washington, and this silly bluff did make not so few people in DC to turn pale.
Knowing how US politics goes, I would say US would've seriously considered rising a white flag, invariable how weak enemy's conventional forces are, in fear of additional strike.
Depends on if you developed the weapon for strictly offensive use of consider it a part or a deterrent strategy. If the latter, you want people to know. It’s the “I don’t want to hurt you, but if I have to you’re dead” of foreign relations.
Given that Israel would likely come under sanction due to non-proliferation policy, and the further pressure on Iran to develop their own, revealing the capability is problematic to say the least.
No nation's military can afford to use nuclear weapons first because it will absolutely result in country-ending retaliatory strikes. There wouldn't have been an Iraq left for Saddam to rule.
Hoping to keep it secret for some kind of strike like that goes right out the window once you've used it, and you will absolutely never strike hard enough to remove the nuclear capacity of somebody like the USA (that's why nuclear submarines exist).
you will absolutely never strike hard enough to remove the nuclear capacity of somebody like the USA (that's why nuclear submarines exist).
That's certain, but being hit by a second strike is already much better than a first strike, or, even better, not being hit at all. See, Saddam almost had it with his bluff.
No nation's military can afford to use nuclear weapons first because it will absolutely result in country-ending retaliatory strikes. There wouldn't have been an Iraq left for Saddam to rule.
See, such naive assumption are exactly what make it more than likely. People are infirm, and all kinds of regime leaders are much better "poker players" than any Western politician out there.
Imagine, you a president of a nation state, or whomever took his place in chain of command. You got news that you biggest city took a hit, possibly hundreds of thousands are dead, than another. You tell you forces to continue to advance, then you hear a loud bang while you sit in your bunker, and there you get a call on your direct line with an offer... to let you live...
I don't see the psychology of warfare being any much different in a nuclear exchange, than in a firefight. You only have one life, and one set of limbs, and with each inch of enemy territory taken you will be asking yourself more and more "isn't that enough?" and you will feel your will almost physically crumbling. Fear of death is a really powerful thing.
When I lived in Canada, I encountered a number of Afghan war veterans. All an every of them who ever been deployed in the field can tell of stories of "unwritten" ceasefire agreements, and exchanges on the radio with Talibans with offers of peaceful withdrawals that never got written into any official report. And this is happening even when Afghan war is a complete turkeyshoot for Nato armies.
being hit by a second strike is already much better than a first strike, or, even better, not being hit at all.
Your "even better" clause is a dramatic understatement of the difference. This is the crucial point upon which nuclear deterrence strategies are based.
What's the use of a nuclear weapon - a weapon strongest of them all, if the enemy know you will never use it? This is where I think, the popular thinking in Western political circles diverges with the cold logic of warfare.
What is the best way to scare your enemy with your commitment to murder him using overwhelming force, than... to start doing so?
The politicians and people reading political science may thing the other way around, war does not work the other way as shown by thousands of years of history.
What's the use of a nuclear weapon - a weapon strongest of them all, if the enemy know you will never use it?
The only reason to keep nuclear weapons is to keep other from using them. It’s called "mutually assured destruction" — "you nuke me, I nuke you" nobody wants that. I.e. the _reason_ to keep nukes is to never use them.
If only one side has nukes, then mutually assured destruction is not possible, and hence there is no safety against nuclear way.
Comments
From the introduction:
Yeah, I think this is the best clue of how the sputh africans tested their nukes.
A weird nuclear policy that one: build and test in secrecy, never tell anyone you have them unless things are really dire, and only then do a public reveal. Explain that one with deterrance theory
That sounds a bit like Israel’s policy — Although officially Israel’s policy is one of deliberate ambiguity, if they have nukes then they are doing exactly what you just said; and if they don’t, then presumably the scientist that they imprisoned for revealing the existence of the nuclear program was a stooge designed to make them look scary without any of the cost and complexity of actually bothering to make any nukes of their own.
He wasn’t a scientist he was a low level technician.
He didn’t even finish high school completely (no diploma), and dropped out of his engineering course at uni.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mordechai_Vanunu
While he did revealed some information a lot of the technical details he talked about during his early interviews made absolutely no sense.
He was imprisoned on the basis of revealing classified information and taking photographs of a sensitive site.
Whether Israel has actual assembled weapons or not, they are a breakout state they have 2 reactors one at Dimona one at Soreq and even if in the 60’s and 70’s they didn’t had the knowledge to build nukes considering they took in nearly 2M Russian Jews and their family members they probably could’ve gained that capability from that immigration since the late 80’s to early 90’s.
Israel can also potentially posses a nuclear Triad however for Israel nukes are only really useful as a deterrent against a conventional threat as due to their size MAD will not work for them against any of their possible opponents in the region.
MAD also requires that everyone in the equation will be sane and held accountable, if there is an Islamist coup in say Pakistan or if a regional theocratic regime gets nukes it’s not clear how MAD would work even if the geographical and population sizes weren’t that different.
MAD still applies to Israel if they can field a sufficient submarine force to retaliate against a first-strike, unless their opposition can also field enough hunter-killer submarines to perform a full decapitation with surety.
Also worth pointing out, while a theocratic takeover of a state like Pakistan would be infinitely problematic, (probably) particularly for non-proliferation, MAD still applies unless the takeover is a flat-out doomsday cult. Problematic as I may find an Islamist theocracy as a Westerner, they're not insane, but simply of very different cultural belief. Should anyone want to live to see tomorrow, and or allow their offspring to do so then MAD applies.
I'm certain they have the nukes, since South Africa did for a fact. They became the first nuclear power to invite the UN to disassemble all their nuclear weapons. Before the apartheid government handed over power to the Mandela government.
Not so weierd... Develop in secret. Once you have it your enemies knows in any case. And if you can maintain plausible deniability it is much easier to keep developing / much less public scrutiny, especially if you already are operating a highly unpopular apartheid state.
I remember that during the war with Cuba in Angola the South Africans deployed their nuke on the border, the Cubans knew this and as such the South African border was never threatend.
I feel like any level of confusion is potentially a greater risk for all involved. We already have seen situations where there is enough doubt about circumstances that people get close to a catastrophic decision when people do know.
There is a Larry Bond book on that. An entertaining read.
It's just the Art of War. If you don't have a strong program yet, say nothing about it and let your enemies wonder about your capabilities. Just because they may have one undeclared test doesn't necessarily mean they could succeed with a public MAD strategy; they may need many more nukes than they currently have.
If they say they have none, their enemies might think there's a chance they actually have a lot, or at least enough to cause serious damage. And there's the deterrence. If they say they have a lot but don't demonstrate it, their enemies will probably think they're bluffing and will demand proof. I think it only makes sense to go public when it's a gun that can be pointed directly at someone's head, rather than a few of their toes. It's probably the best way to project a strong posture despite not actually having one.
And more practically, it lets them develop the program with less chance of other countries (including allies) complaining about it or condemning it, which could potentially slow it down or stop it before it's sufficiently developed.
They were intended to defend against conventional attacks by their neighbors, not deter other nuclear powers. It would still be nice to deter such attacks, but it also works to reveal them after the attack begins, or just use them. I imagine they didn’t think it was worth provoking condemnation from the international community by revealing them.
Revealing that you have a weapon as strong as the nuke is the stupidest thing to do for a military force
Unless your opponent has a retaliatory nuclear capability. Especially one that requires minimal human action:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Hand
Surprise attacks with a super-weapon only works if you're the first to have one.
Again, that only works if you can "outpoker" your opponent, and if this alone will be sufficient to crush his will to fight back.
I don’t follow, why would it be stupid?
Basic of military tactics, don't let enemy know what have hit them. Or better to rephrase, don't let your enemy to know what you will hit them with, moreover if the weapon you will hit them is that big.
Imagine US actions if in 2003, mushroom clouds would've actually risen over major US cities, out of a sudden. If you remember, Saddam did a last minute bluff, promising "fiery death" to NYC, and Washington, and this silly bluff did make not so few people in DC to turn pale.
Knowing how US politics goes, I would say US would've seriously considered rising a white flag, invariable how weak enemy's conventional forces are, in fear of additional strike.
Depends on if you developed the weapon for strictly offensive use of consider it a part or a deterrent strategy. If the latter, you want people to know. It’s the “I don’t want to hurt you, but if I have to you’re dead” of foreign relations.
Given that Israel would likely come under sanction due to non-proliferation policy, and the further pressure on Iran to develop their own, revealing the capability is problematic to say the least.
No nation's military can afford to use nuclear weapons first because it will absolutely result in country-ending retaliatory strikes. There wouldn't have been an Iraq left for Saddam to rule.
Hoping to keep it secret for some kind of strike like that goes right out the window once you've used it, and you will absolutely never strike hard enough to remove the nuclear capacity of somebody like the USA (that's why nuclear submarines exist).
That's certain, but being hit by a second strike is already much better than a first strike, or, even better, not being hit at all. See, Saddam almost had it with his bluff.
See, such naive assumption are exactly what make it more than likely. People are infirm, and all kinds of regime leaders are much better "poker players" than any Western politician out there.
Imagine, you a president of a nation state, or whomever took his place in chain of command. You got news that you biggest city took a hit, possibly hundreds of thousands are dead, than another. You tell you forces to continue to advance, then you hear a loud bang while you sit in your bunker, and there you get a call on your direct line with an offer... to let you live...
I don't see the psychology of warfare being any much different in a nuclear exchange, than in a firefight. You only have one life, and one set of limbs, and with each inch of enemy territory taken you will be asking yourself more and more "isn't that enough?" and you will feel your will almost physically crumbling. Fear of death is a really powerful thing.
When I lived in Canada, I encountered a number of Afghan war veterans. All an every of them who ever been deployed in the field can tell of stories of "unwritten" ceasefire agreements, and exchanges on the radio with Talibans with offers of peaceful withdrawals that never got written into any official report. And this is happening even when Afghan war is a complete turkeyshoot for Nato armies.
Your "even better" clause is a dramatic understatement of the difference. This is the crucial point upon which nuclear deterrence strategies are based.
You've said this multiple times but failed to support it in any way
The idea of nuclear weapons is not to hit the opponent by surprise, but to deter them from attacking you in the first place.
You're thinking tactically, not strategically.
The best nukes are the ones that never need to be used.
What's the use of a nuclear weapon - a weapon strongest of them all, if the enemy know you will never use it? This is where I think, the popular thinking in Western political circles diverges with the cold logic of warfare.
What is the best way to scare your enemy with your commitment to murder him using overwhelming force, than... to start doing so?
The politicians and people reading political science may thing the other way around, war does not work the other way as shown by thousands of years of history.
The only reason to keep nuclear weapons is to keep other from using them. It’s called "mutually assured destruction" — "you nuke me, I nuke you" nobody wants that. I.e. the _reason_ to keep nukes is to never use them.
If only one side has nukes, then mutually assured destruction is not possible, and hence there is no safety against nuclear way.
You are not understanding my logic
... logic doesn’t work like that. There is no «my logic» and «your logic,» if «your logic» differs from actual logic, then your logic is flawed.
It is a deterrent. This isn't complicated.
"never need to be used" is different from "are unwilling to use if attacked"
If it was a test: how comes they didn't publish any official confirmations/specific details when SA got rid of her nukes?