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Comment on AES-GMAC-CTR (SIV)parent

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I had the same thought, but doesn't a larger nonce simply decrease the chance for a duplicate nonce? Even if the chance is decreased to practically-impossible-to-duplicate levels, I could see the thought process being "if we're going to have to roll our own implementation to change the nonce size anyway, we might as well make an implementation that is provably impossible to suffer security issues from a duplicate nonce rather than one that is just immensely unlikely".

I'm not sure if that's really the right choice, but I could at least see that being their reasoning, especially if they're going for FIPS certification which maybe (correct me if I'm wrong) would care about something being provably impossible rather than just provably unlikely?

(disclaimer: my crypto knowledge is fairly surface level and I'm making this comment in a genuine attempt to learn)

It decreases the chance for a duplicate nonce in somewhat the same sense as increasing key sizes decreases the chance of a guessed key. In cryptography, past some threshold, you get to rely on probability.

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