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Comment on Monzo urges 480k customers to change their pin numbersparent

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When traditional banks do "1st, 2nd and 4th character" checks (i.e. via their apps), some go to pretty good lengths to protect these, even given the limited entropy.

These systems are typically backed by HSMs, and the HSM generates a high-entropy "challenge". The challenge is sent to the client, which combines the challenge with the characters the user entered. The resulting hash is sent back to the HSM, which can verify internally that the correct characters were selected, by computing the expected hash for the correct response (hopefully in constant-time).

It seems there is a bigger issue here -- Monzo used card PINs as a generic security credential in their app, and was storing them in a recoverable form (albeit only accessible to a very small number of staff). That's not standard practice elsewhere that I'm aware of - given use of the PIN is the "proof" you approved the transaction, it's usually used only in environments with dedicated PIN entry devices (ATM, card readers), rather than commodity devices (phones), unless those go through PCI-style verification and approval.

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