Maybe if we want safety first we should be engineering lead, and only have sales/customer desires as inputs that are considered when creating a design that fulfills market needs.
That includes all stages of engineering knowing the big picture, even if they don't happen to be acting upon it, so that there are safety checks possible at every stage of design and implementation.
Safety is never actually first. First, you need an economically viable product. Otherwise, there is no reason for it or any if the processes behind it to exist.
Yes, but the airline industry has been doing a great job for the most part on both safety and economics.
The A320 costs about what the 737 costs and it has a flight envelope protection system with much better safety. It's had problems in the past that Airbus has learned from and that Boeing has applied to their newer airliners, but that Boeing got amnesia for when it came to the legacy 737.
(The A320 fly-by-wire also improves fuel efficiency, lowers maintenance costs, rides out turbulence to improve comfort, etc.)
Also the lack of safety has not saved anybody any money. I think now Boeing is saying they've lost $8 billion because of the MAX problems, and if they took that plus what they spent to make the MAX they could have been a clean sheet replacement for the 737.
People are so used to the 737 that they don't realize what a backwards airplane it is. Every other airliner from every manufacturer makes some claim that it is comfortable on their official web page. The 737 doesn't because it is the least comfortable airliner (and thus is the baseline everything is compared to.) The 737 is loud for passengers, pilots, and people on the ground. The A220 and E190 are smaller planes that are much more comfortable because they are designed around the human body as opposed to 1960's aeronautics. Compared to a clean sheet design, the 737 wastes fuel, causes excess global warming, has a higher seat-mile cost, and it makes everybody miserable while doing so.
The A320 and 737 have similar sticker prices, but it's not clear if one is cheaper to buy than the other because the prices paid for planes tend to be around half of the sticker price but the real prices aren't public.
The A320 is around 10k lbs heavier than the 737 and the A320 series burns more fuel per passenger mile (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_economy_in_aircraft). The A321 NEO is nearer the efficiency of the Boeing 737-900 than than the 737 MAX 10.
The passenger comfort of the 'human focused' designs often comes at the cost of fuel efficiency.
You're right that the 737 is loud and an old design. I don't dispute that Boeing messed up their one job (making safe planes) but to call the 737 secular stagnation when the newest version is nearly three times as efficient (in terms of fuel burned to move a passenger one miles) as the original 737 misunderstands "stagnation".
The second gen 737 was long in the tooth. IIRC, the 737 NG has a much better wing than it needs because its landing gear is so short that the plane can't get the right angle of attack on the airfoil during rotation.
It's kind of deliciously ironic that Boeing's attempts to cut corners are going to cost them more than a clean sheet redesign, but I really wonder what's going to replace the 737.
We're at the point where we're doing inappropriate things with single aisle aircraft - it's just not great that we're about to have 9 hour flights on A321XLRs. It seems like there's a natural limit of 140-160 passengers on single aisle aircraft but and hubris has us cramming 220 people in them.
Hopefully someone figures out composites enough to create lifting wide bodies but we'll see.
This is always touted around. Fine, you're not wrong. I think the missing implicit assertion that also needs the same level of preaching is "and truly free markets".
Last I checked, the plane industry was not a free market
Safety IS first. If it's not safe it won't fly no matter how cheap it is. This is clearly a case where engineers were proposing an inferior solution that allowed a lower price point. They mislead the whole company and let their colleagues down.
“Safe” is a relative term.
For example, it would have been safer for the plane to have 2 more engines. But there are only 2 engines since it’s safe enough and much more economically viable.
It doesn’t matter how safe something is if no one is going to buy it.
“Not a death trap” is a relative term. Safety is a feature and like any other feature it gets prioritized according to need, budget, ROI, and many other factors.
Maybe engineers would be more careful if they were held liable for the faulty designs they produce. This safety system wasn't designed by marketing. It was designed by engineers and deemed sufficient. Several people signed off on it. Boeing is working hard on rectifying every possible flaw and it is doing so under close scrunity. Blame shifting won't help us to get out of this mess and get those planes flying again. Now is the time to work out a solution with the regulators and get those planes delivered to the customers who eagerly await them.
It was designed by engineers and deemed sufficient. Several people signed off on it.
In a company with failing engineering quality, what typically happens is that, of all the engineers qualified to sign off, management over time tend to choose the ones who are more willing to sign off. The more careful engineers who refuse to sign off, or attempt to negotiate harder for safety before signing off, are not promoted over the less careful engineers. The result is that the engineers in a position to sign off increasingly comprise the less careful ones.
Who is to blame in this case: the management who drive the process that selects the less careful engineers, or the less careful engineers?
I'm surprised that you think this is a solution - this won't solve anything besides making it easier for management to blame engineers because it doesn't target the people making the ultimate judgement call - the leadership.
The leadership (including the board who are proxies for stockholders) is ultimately liable - they hire, fire, set the strategy, values, and goals for the company. They reap the rewards of profits and take on some risk. That's the difference between a regular employee and an officer. When you have a business that involves public safety like car and airplane manufacturers, a large part of your business should be ensuring that everyone from the lowest level employee to the CEO is at or above industry standards for safety.
Unless there were fraudulent numbers then I don't think holding the engineers responsible makes any sense. Product owners set the stage and place the blinders on the engineers. Good product owners will do so in a productive way, careerist con artists will do otherwise.
Comments
Maybe if we want safety first we should be engineering lead, and only have sales/customer desires as inputs that are considered when creating a design that fulfills market needs.
That includes all stages of engineering knowing the big picture, even if they don't happen to be acting upon it, so that there are safety checks possible at every stage of design and implementation.
Safety is never actually first. First, you need an economically viable product. Otherwise, there is no reason for it or any if the processes behind it to exist.
Yes, but the airline industry has been doing a great job for the most part on both safety and economics.
The A320 costs about what the 737 costs and it has a flight envelope protection system with much better safety. It's had problems in the past that Airbus has learned from and that Boeing has applied to their newer airliners, but that Boeing got amnesia for when it came to the legacy 737.
(The A320 fly-by-wire also improves fuel efficiency, lowers maintenance costs, rides out turbulence to improve comfort, etc.)
Also the lack of safety has not saved anybody any money. I think now Boeing is saying they've lost $8 billion because of the MAX problems, and if they took that plus what they spent to make the MAX they could have been a clean sheet replacement for the 737.
People are so used to the 737 that they don't realize what a backwards airplane it is. Every other airliner from every manufacturer makes some claim that it is comfortable on their official web page. The 737 doesn't because it is the least comfortable airliner (and thus is the baseline everything is compared to.) The 737 is loud for passengers, pilots, and people on the ground. The A220 and E190 are smaller planes that are much more comfortable because they are designed around the human body as opposed to 1960's aeronautics. Compared to a clean sheet design, the 737 wastes fuel, causes excess global warming, has a higher seat-mile cost, and it makes everybody miserable while doing so.
The 737 is what secular stagnation looks like.
You're missing some important details.
The A320 and 737 have similar sticker prices, but it's not clear if one is cheaper to buy than the other because the prices paid for planes tend to be around half of the sticker price but the real prices aren't public.
The A320 is around 10k lbs heavier than the 737 and the A320 series burns more fuel per passenger mile (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_economy_in_aircraft). The A321 NEO is nearer the efficiency of the Boeing 737-900 than than the 737 MAX 10.
The passenger comfort of the 'human focused' designs often comes at the cost of fuel efficiency.
You're right that the 737 is loud and an old design. I don't dispute that Boeing messed up their one job (making safe planes) but to call the 737 secular stagnation when the newest version is nearly three times as efficient (in terms of fuel burned to move a passenger one miles) as the original 737 misunderstands "stagnation".
Up to a point the 737 got better, but the same things that made it get better (longer range) made it get worse (worse comfort)
An engineering prof I worked with years ago said that the 737 NG was already long in the tooth
https://www.newsweek.com/boeings-737-airplane-prone-problems...
and has a great quote from Tony: "Boeing are (sic.) stuck with a design that they want to fly forever."
The second gen 737 was long in the tooth. IIRC, the 737 NG has a much better wing than it needs because its landing gear is so short that the plane can't get the right angle of attack on the airfoil during rotation.
It's kind of deliciously ironic that Boeing's attempts to cut corners are going to cost them more than a clean sheet redesign, but I really wonder what's going to replace the 737.
We're at the point where we're doing inappropriate things with single aisle aircraft - it's just not great that we're about to have 9 hour flights on A321XLRs. It seems like there's a natural limit of 140-160 passengers on single aisle aircraft but and hubris has us cramming 220 people in them.
Hopefully someone figures out composites enough to create lifting wide bodies but we'll see.
This is always touted around. Fine, you're not wrong. I think the missing implicit assertion that also needs the same level of preaching is "and truly free markets".
Last I checked, the plane industry was not a free market
Safety IS first. If it's not safe it won't fly no matter how cheap it is. This is clearly a case where engineers were proposing an inferior solution that allowed a lower price point. They mislead the whole company and let their colleagues down.
“Safe” is a relative term. For example, it would have been safer for the plane to have 2 more engines. But there are only 2 engines since it’s safe enough and much more economically viable.
It doesn’t matter how safe something is if no one is going to buy it.
Safe is not a relative term in mass transport aerospace.
Safe means "not a death trap."
That level of safety is a hard prerequisite for a viable product. There is no ambiguity about this.
“Not a death trap” is a relative term. Safety is a feature and like any other feature it gets prioritized according to need, budget, ROI, and many other factors.
No version of this plane has ever been as bad as "death trap".
Maybe engineers would be more careful if they were held liable for the faulty designs they produce. This safety system wasn't designed by marketing. It was designed by engineers and deemed sufficient. Several people signed off on it. Boeing is working hard on rectifying every possible flaw and it is doing so under close scrunity. Blame shifting won't help us to get out of this mess and get those planes flying again. Now is the time to work out a solution with the regulators and get those planes delivered to the customers who eagerly await them.
In a company with failing engineering quality, what typically happens is that, of all the engineers qualified to sign off, management over time tend to choose the ones who are more willing to sign off. The more careful engineers who refuse to sign off, or attempt to negotiate harder for safety before signing off, are not promoted over the less careful engineers. The result is that the engineers in a position to sign off increasingly comprise the less careful ones.
Who is to blame in this case: the management who drive the process that selects the less careful engineers, or the less careful engineers?
I'm surprised that you think this is a solution - this won't solve anything besides making it easier for management to blame engineers because it doesn't target the people making the ultimate judgement call - the leadership.
The leadership (including the board who are proxies for stockholders) is ultimately liable - they hire, fire, set the strategy, values, and goals for the company. They reap the rewards of profits and take on some risk. That's the difference between a regular employee and an officer. When you have a business that involves public safety like car and airplane manufacturers, a large part of your business should be ensuring that everyone from the lowest level employee to the CEO is at or above industry standards for safety.
Unless there were fraudulent numbers then I don't think holding the engineers responsible makes any sense. Product owners set the stage and place the blinders on the engineers. Good product owners will do so in a productive way, careerist con artists will do otherwise.