This is dangerous conjecture at best. I'm a little sick of reading that MCAS shouldn't exist.
MCAS must exist.
The flight regime where MCAS would need to act should be exceedingly rare. The bug isn't that MCAS exists. The bug is that there is a failure in the code/inputs to the system which allow it to trigger in regimes where it shouldn't.
Are you asserting that MCAS must exist as a condition of its certification? And that without it the airplane is not airworthy?
Can you reference any checklist item that when followed causes the airplane to become unairworthy?
If MCAS is required for the airplane to be airworthy, following the FAA and Boeing's directive to set stab trim to cutoff in the specific case of "MCAS upset" under discussion, directs pilots to make the airplane unairworthy as a work around for a perturbed system. I don't see how this is a defendable regime.
Comments
This is dangerous conjecture at best. I'm a little sick of reading that MCAS shouldn't exist.
MCAS must exist.
The flight regime where MCAS would need to act should be exceedingly rare. The bug isn't that MCAS exists. The bug is that there is a failure in the code/inputs to the system which allow it to trigger in regimes where it shouldn't.
Are you asserting that MCAS must exist as a condition of its certification? And that without it the airplane is not airworthy?
Can you reference any checklist item that when followed causes the airplane to become unairworthy?
If MCAS is required for the airplane to be airworthy, following the FAA and Boeing's directive to set stab trim to cutoff in the specific case of "MCAS upset" under discussion, directs pilots to make the airplane unairworthy as a work around for a perturbed system. I don't see how this is a defendable regime.